A New Middle East?

Peering into the state of affairs in the Middle East reveals that the region might be on the verge of sea change. On various levels, and in several subsystems, a significant remoulding of maps, alliances and norms seems to be on the horizon. In this Middle East in flux, fundamental alliances are crumbling, old paths are being abandoned, political articles of faith are questioned, new plots and schemes are planned, emerging actors that don’t play it safe are asserting their presence, and traditional powers are groping to find their way amid increasing difficulties.

The winds of change are blowing in all directions. The contours of some of these changes already manifested themselves in the crisis that erupted last June between the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain on one hand and Qatar on the other. The standoff demonstrated that small Middle Eastern states that strive to punch above their weight have become regional forces to be reckoned with. In essence, the crisis was a testimony to the rising power of Qatar and the UAE: the former has proved influential enough to trigger the enforcement of a political and economic blockade by four more powerful states; the latter has led the anti-Qatar coalition and strove to push Doha out of the fold.

The crisis also marked the demise of the role of regional institutions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League (AL), and their replacement by other, less formal and institutionalized, groupings. For instance, instead of its traditional reliance on the AL and the Organization of Islamic Conference, Saudi Arabia has preferred to work within the so-called Arab Alliance in Yemen, and the Quartet in regional politics. If this trend continues, which seems like the case, these institutions run the risk of descending into total irrelevance.     

In Gaza, an unanticipated political warming of relations between Hamas and its erstwhile bitter rival, Fateh’s former security honcho Mohamed Dahlan, has been in the making for months. According to the plan, whose full details are still unclear, Dahlan will return from his exile in the UAE to become prime minister of Gaza, Hamas will retain its control of the security file and Egypt will reopen the Rafah Crossing. Obviously, the step is taken in open defiance of Fateh and the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, with which Dahlan has been at loggerheads for many years.

If finalized, the new arrangement - which is mediated by Egypt, financed by the UAE and indirectly backed by the United States - would significantly reshape Palestinian politics. It would reinforce the current division between Gaza and the West Bank, and undermine the influence of Abbas over Palestinian political and armed factions. It would also subject solid regional alliances to a drastic reconfiguration. News of the plan have already drawn the ire of Abbas and strained Cairo’s longstanding relations with Fateh,

Yet, the most striking outcome of this deal is that it might turn the cautious rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt into a substantial alliance, an unthinkable development in light of the antagonism and mistrust that have governed their relations over the past decades. Hamas has already tightened its control of the Egypt border, and organized a huge rally to declare its support for the Egyptian army in its war against terrorism. In return, Cairo has, as scholar Michele Dunne explained, “abandoned earlier efforts to isolate or crush Hamas,” the Palestinian offshoot of its domestic nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood.     

Meanwhile, another political storm may be gathering in the heart of the Arab world. A final solution for the Palestinian question - the “ultimate deal” in the words of Donald Trump, or the “deal of the century” as the Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi dubbed it – has slowly come to the surface. It has apparently gained currency in Washington and Arab capitals in recent months. US and Middle Eastern leaders have not explained what exactly is meant by these terms, and whether they describe a workable short-term framework agreement or just a distant long-term objective. However, media reports indicate that the plan offers a formula to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that involves the entire Arab world, and imply that it would radically transform both Middle Eastern politics and geography. According to these reports, the vision includes the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, which would include parts of northern Sinai, and would accommodate Palestinian refugees. Israel would in return concede parts of its territory to Egypt. Full normalization between Israel and Arab states would ensue, which might pave the way for the formation of an Israel-Sunni Arab coalition against Iran.        

Concurrently, the time-honored norms of Arab politics are slowly changing. Most Arab states no longer pay deference, or even lip service, to the ideals of pan-Arabism or Islamism, which have consistently been seen as sources of domestic legitimacy. For decades following the inception of the modern Arab state system, Arab regimes used to make noise about Arab unity, the plight of the Palestinians and the wellbeing of the Islamic Umma. But now they make no effort to hide that realpolitik, not ideology, has become a fact of life in Arab politics. Saudi Arabia, for one, has to a large extent relinquished its historical role as a leading ‘Muslim’ country and the guardian of the Muslim holy shrines. It is now wagering on military might rather than Muslim diplomacy. That’s not entirely a surprise in light of Riyadh’s relentless bombing of a fellow Muslim country, Yemen, and its secret endeavors to develop ties with Israel—both taboos in the eyes of Arab people.

Other crucial developments in the region include a possible rapprochement between two of the region’s leading powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia. Signs suggesting a possible thaw in their icing relations include a handshake between the foreign ministers of the two countries in Istanbul, a rare visit by Iraq’s Shia cleric Muqtada Sadr to Saudi Arabia, and a declared plan to exchange diplomatic visits after the end of the Hajj season. In the shifting sands of the Levant, the Islamic State is losing territory and influence; the balance of power is tipping in favor of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad who is clawing back territory from the rebels; and a referendum for the independence of Kurdistan is slated for September 25.

The implications of these developments for the international relations of the Middle East are still not fully clear, but are likely to be extremely significant. Bashar’s victory will embolden Arab autocrats and undermine the already meagre prospects of democratic transition in their countries; the rise of an independent Kurdistan in Iraq will encourage separatist Kurds in Turkey to follow suit, and may ignite a new civil war in Iraq for the control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk; the deal of the century would put an end to the 70-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict; and a shift in regional alliances would likely breed a change in the region’s balance of power, disrupt the pecking order of the Arab state system and, perhaps, trigger the birth of an entirely new regional order. Domestically, meanwhile, a world of difference still exists between the expectations of Arab people and the foreign policies of their states. Legitimacy deficits persist, patience is wearing thin and instability remains the order of the day.

Nael Shama

* This essay appeared in The New Arab (English) on September 11, 2017.

The Broken Wings of Egypt's Propaganda Machine

Since the beginning of Israel's war on Gaza, the official Egyptian propaganda machine has been working at full capacity, but what it has produced is a mixture of sheer lies and half-truths. There is a political and moral imperative to evaluate the basic arguments of that machine.

1- Hamas is responsible for the war.
Hamas was the result of the lingering Palestinian-Israeli conflict, not the cause of it. The clock of Egypt's propaganda machine, however, started ticking on Dec. 19, 2008 when Hamas rejected an extension of the truce with Israel if its unjust conditions are not amended, particularly the lifting of the blockade imposed on Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinians. Israel's aggressive intentions need no elaboration; it had fought the Arab world five times (in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982) and occupied the land of four Arab states (Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt) before Hamas even existed. Today's offense is reminiscent of the invasions of Lebanon in 1982 and the West Bank in 2002 waged to demolish the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority respectively. Israel's target has always been the obliteration of Palestinian resistance, irrespective of the banner it raises.

The moral and political responsibility of the current aggression lies primarily on Israel, whose war machine has brutally bombed civilian quarters in total disregard of international law and human rights conventions. Moreover, it is highly questionable that Israel would not have carried out its attack had Hamas agreed to extend the ceasefire. Besides, the current aggression is an extension of the so-called truce, during which Israel had turned the Strip into the biggest concentration camp on earth, and deprived it of basic food and medicine supplies.

Nevertheless, Egypt's extremely insolent propaganda machine blames the victim and is satisfied with directing meek condemnations at the assailant who would have carried out the attack in all cases, driven by a military doctrine premised on aggression and expansion, and internal political ambitions that thrive on Palestinian blood.

2- Egyptian diplomacy is doing its best to stop the Israeli aggression.
Egypt's diplomatic reaction to the war on Gaza has been, at best, cold. It is interesting to note that on the day following the start of the Israeli offensive, the Egyptian President contacted one foreign head of state: the King of Bahrain Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa. If the conflict-rich Middle East resembles a jungle, then Bahrain – the smallest Arab nation -- would be the jungle's harmless ant; and ants do not have any leverage over elephants.

Any student of international politics knows that any serious diplomatic effort to stop the aggression would have approached Washington, and major European and Arab capitals that can make a difference in the Middle East. Egypt remained aloof for the first days of hostilities. President Mubarak's first statement came on the fourth day of aggression and its diplomatic effort commenced only after Israel had started its ground operation.

Furthermore, Egypt has not been enthusiastic about the idea of convening an emergency Arab summit. One could also wonder why the sale of Egyptian gas to Israel continues uninterrupted. Verbal condemnation and humanitarian relief is all what Egypt could do in the face of the slaughter in Gaza. An article appearing in The Middle East Times a few years ago carried the title: "Egypt Slips from Powerbroker to Event Planner." Inspired by the current crisis, the title could be rephrased to "Egypt Slips from Powerhouse to Ambulance."

3- The Rafah Crossing is subject to an international treaty that Egypt must respect.
In response to mounting popular pressure on Egypt to guarantee permanent opening of the Rafah Crossing, Egyptian top officials contend that the treaty signed in 2005 by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the European Union to regulate the Rafah Crossing is binding to Egypt. Thus, the gate will remain closed, except for the treatment of humanitarian cases.

Contrast the Egyptian regime's absolute adherence to this insignificant treaty that it did not even sign with its domestic disregard for the constitution, laws, and basic principles of human rights. Contrast that posture also with the number and intensity of Israeli violations of international law, human rights conventions, and Security Council resolutions over six decades. In the period between 1967 and 2000, for example, Israel had been the subject of 138 Security Council resolutions. Most of these resolutions called on the Jewish state to end its occupation of Arab land and to act in accordance with the basic principles of international law. Israel flouted them all.

The reason why a treaty that encroaches upon Egypt's sovereignty and that aggravates the human tragedy of Gaza's population is so revered by Cairo is political, not legal, namely destabilizing the rule of Hamas in Gaza and emboldening its rivals in Ramallah.

4- Hamas is totally under Iran's control.
Hamas receives political and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, but that does not necessarily mean that the former is a stooge of the latter.

First, Iranian financial support to Iran has been minor. Shaul Mishal, professor at Tel Aviv University, says: " I don’t really see Iran stepping forward and filling the gap for Hamas as far as money is concerned, and whatever assistance is provided will certainly have many strings attached – perhaps too many to make it worthwhile, for the amounts of money we would be talking about."

Secondly, sectarian differences and Hamas' inclination to ward off outside influence propelled her to put Iran at arm's length. Anat Kurtz, a scholar of Hamas at the Israeli Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies explained that Hamas is, first and foremost, "a nationalist organization – it is Palestinian before being radical Islamist. Too close an affiliation with Iran could undermine its goal of establishing itself as the leading actor in the Palestinian political scene.” Another Israeli scholar, Meir Litvak, argued that Hamas "might like some kind of beneficial partnership [with Iran], but subordination ― never."

5- Egypt has always served the Palestinian question.
Egypt staunchly supported the Palestinian cause in the few decades following the loss of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel. But when Egypt's rulers saw a contradiction that could not be reconciled between its national interests and its pan-Arab commitments, they opted for the former. The product was Egypt's separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979 that neutralized the strongest and most populous Arab country, thereby depriving the Palestinians of their only stalwart Arab ally.

The argument that "Egypt has always served the Palestinian question" is clearly used to tickle chauvinistic feelings, but it is not scientifically accurate. Obviously, to thwart supra-state identities (such as Islamism and Arabism), the Egyptian state has opted for reviving nationalist Egyptian feelings.

6- The Egyptian officer killed by Hamas militants is a martyr.
Perhaps. But what about the Egyptian soldiers who were killed by Israeli fire across the Egyptian-Palestinian border? In the period between 2004 and 2008, at least eight Egyptians were killed along Egypt's border with the Gaza Strip. They were buried in silence, no reverence, no attention. In contrast, heroes are made of the Egyptian victim of Hamas; prime media time is generously offered to highlight the agony of the deceased's loved ones and a military funeral is held in honor of 'the brave officer who was safeguarding Egypt's sacred land'.

In other words, Egyptian bloodshed at the hands of Israeli Apachi helicopters and F-16s is cheap and neglected. But hostile Palestinian bullets are an opportunity to legitimize Egypt's antagonistic stance toward Hamas and mobilize people against it. Double-standards reveal hypocrisy and reflect policy too; the crimes of Israel are forgiven because Israel is an ally, Hamas is a foe. No wonder the Israeli commentator Zvi Bar'el wrote in Haaretz that following the Egyptian media gives the impression that the real war is between Egypt and Hamas, not Israel and Hamas. President Mubarak spelled out his intentions when he told a European delegation that "Hamas must not be allowed to win."

The bloodbath on Egypt's doorstep is a reminder that Israel comprises the real threat to Egypt's national security, not Hamas. But the strategic calculations of the nation have been overshadowed by the narrow interests of a ruling elite.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on January 15, 2009.