Nikita
Khrushchev once said that "politicians are the same all over," for
"they promise to build a bridge even where there is no river." I
agree with the second part. While most politicians are prone to making hefty
promises and unrealistic pledges, their deeds and fates diverge fundamentally.
Some politicians succeed and inspire, others fail drastically, leaving office
disheartened and ostracized. Some politicians are forever remembered, others sink
into oblivion in the blink of an eye. More importantly, only a few politicians conquer
the constraints imposed by their environments, the rest remain prisoners of
their own time.
To
which type of politicians does Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's first democratically-elected
president who was ousted from power last Wednesday, belong? While Morsi's
supporters overstated his capabilities, his detractors questioned either his
competence or his intentions, or both. In any case, political leaders are predominantly
the product of their idiosyncrasies; their policies are rooted in their personas,
socialization processes, ideas, and worldviews, and Morsi is far from being an
exception.
Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood: The Inseparable Bond
Morsi
was born in 1951 into a humble family in the village of El-Adwah, Sharkia
governorate. Available information on his early childhood suggests he led an
ordinary village life, characterized by enormous economic and social
difficulties prevalent in Egypt's some 5,000 villages. Morsi recalled that he
used to go to school on the back of a donkey.
[1]
For Morsi, just like many of his peers, joining the ranks of the well-organized
and deeply entrenched Muslim Brotherhood group (MB) seemed like a natural
choice. In the largely underdeveloped countryside, where poverty is rife and
public services are scarce, the MB has stepped in to fill the vacuum left (or,
perhaps, created) by the state. The wide range of charitable services the group
provides in rural areas are clothed in the robes of piety and religious
righteousness. To be sure, when people are economically deprived and profoundly
religious, the provision of material sustenance combined with the soothing lure
of religious talk—that is, food for the body and the soul—is the most effective
tool to attract followers and sympathizers.
Morsi
spent the last three decades of his life in the womb of the MB. He imbibed at a
young age the group's ideology and the values of organizational discipline and
loyalty to senior leaders. It was these three decades that witnessed the rise
of the disciples of Sayed Qutb's orthodox school of thought to the upper
echelons of the MB. Qutb, a writer, Islamist theorist and activist executed in
1966 for plotting against Nasser's regime, adopted a rigid interpretation of
the Quran, going as far as condemning Egyptians for living in a state of 'jahiliyyah'
(ignorance of divine guidance). Although the current generation of MB leaders discard
Qutb's proclivity for violence, they harbor feelings of admiration for him and
his ideology. Indeed, Morsi
defended the ideas of Qutb on a TV show in 2009, saying that he
"discovered Islam from the writings of Sayyid Qutb."
Morsi
was little known at home when he entered the presidential race in 2012.
He was not a shadowy figure in the MB, but was
not so influential either. He was rather a typical Muslim brother, rising up
the ladder of the MB by means of diligence, dedication and loyalty. The
Economist described him as a "quiet and loyal enforcer."
[2]
Prior to his election as president, Morsi was ranked the sixth or seventh in
the ironclad hierarchy of the MB. At any rate, he was outweighed by strongmen
like Mohamed Badie, the MB's spiritual guide; his deputy Khairat Al-Shater, the
strategist and financier of the group; and Mahmoud Ezzat, a leading figure with
extensive administrative experience and influence. Al-Shater was the group's
first-choice candidate for the May 2012 presidential election, but following
his disqualification by the elections' supreme committee, the MB opted for Mohamed
Morsi, then the president of the Freedom and Justice Party (the political wing
of the group established a few months after Mubarak's ouster).
Morsi's
subordination to the leaders of the MB, particularly Badie to whom he gave an oath
of allegiance, posed questions of conflicting loyalties and their presumable
impact on state policies. The national interest was frequently relinquished in
favor of the ruling elite's interest under Mubarak regime's nepotism. Likewise,
many Egyptians questioned over the past year the president's independence and
self-determination, and wondered whether the parochial interests of the MB took
precedence over the national interest. Indeed, during his year at the helm, Morsi's
stances never departed from those advocated and promoted by the MB.
Morsi's attachment to the MB was in essence double-pronged.
Not only was he organizationally and psychologically tied to the leadership of the
MB, but he was also circumspect about maintaining the loyalty and support of
his broad constituency, namely the rank and file of the MB and other Islamist
parties and movements. The growing defiance of the opposition and revolutionary
youth over the past months pushed him into intensifying his alliance with
Islamist forces, including fringe movements. From last November's tense
standoff with the opposition and until his downfall, Morsi had increasingly
surrounded himself with his trusted 'brothers,' planting loyalists in the
presidential palace and key government positions while excluding other political
and social forces. The resignations of ten of Morsi's non-MB advisors (out of a
total of 18 presidential advisors) did not alert him to the deficiencies of the
decision-making process, but instead deepened his reliance on the MB.
Heavily
influenced by the years spent in the milieu of the MB, Morsi's socialization process
was mirrored in his decision-making style. The MB was a secretive underground
movement that worked behind closed doors almost since its inception in 1928,
and that was legally "outlawed" in Mubarak's three decades of rule. To
dodge the state's persecution, its trained-on-concealment members shrouded
their activities in clandestineness and vigilance. Similarly, there was hardly
any transparency in the policies of Morsi and his government. Unanticipated policy
approaches and government plans appeared abruptly, and were withdrawn by the
government as suddenly and mysteriously as they emerged. As a result, shady
backroom deals and secret agreements between the president and his allies became
more significant than official announcements and public speeches.
The
MB was Morsi's asset and liability concurrently. His unwillingness, perhaps
even inability, to restrain his reliance on the MB (and to convince his
countrymen that he was serving the interests of all Egyptians equally) came at
a heavy price. After just one year in power, the polarization of Egyptian
politics deepened, his legitimacy was undermined, and calls for an early
presidential election proliferated across the country, eventually putting an
end to his regime.
Inside Morsi's Mind
A
streak of countryside conservatism along with basic religious teaching acquired
through a lengthy process of indoctrination in the MB seems to have produced
Morsi's belief system. The lack of in-depth philosophical or religious learning
coupled with self-imposed insulation from other political and ideological
currents led to a simplified understanding of the 'self' and the 'other,' and
of complex, multi-faceted political and social phenomenon. For Morsi, the world's
nations, political actors and ideologies are predominantly perceived in 'black-and-white'
terms, with no shades of grey. Believing that they stand on the right side of
history, Morsi and his men saw legitimate political competition through the
prism of conspiracy, and accordingly they distrusted, stigmatized, and sometimes
even equated with treason opposition to his rule.
If
discourse reflects mindset, then much about Morsi can be learned from his
words. Replete with popular clichés and misconceptions that jumble politics with
ideology and religion, Morsi's discourse before the 2011 revolution was analogous
to that of mediocre preachers or demagogic, politically-illiterate politicians.
In this discourse, Israel is relentlessly damned, the backwardness of the
Muslim
Umma (nation) is blamed on external conspiracies and the West is essentially
seen through the prism of sexual and moral decadence. While there is a shred of
truth in these vapid stereotypes, most Islamists regard them as the exclusive
version of truth. Unsurprisingly thus, in an interview with scholar Nathan
Brown conducted a few years ago, Morsi "put forward a conspiratorial
explanation" of the events of 9/11.
[3]
In the same vein, in a September 2010 video that surfaced a few months ago,
Morsi described Zionists as "bloodsuckers" and "the descendants
of apes and pigs."
[4]
Also, in an interview with the New York Times last September, Morsi expressed
his dismay at "the West's looser sexual mores," mentioning
"naked restaurants" like Hooters.
[5]
Driven
by his need to accentuate the differences between himself and Mubarak, who remained
largely aloof and stolid for three decades, Morsi barely missed an opportunity
to talk to the public. He presumably broke a world record by delivering more
than 50 speeches, sermons and television interviews in his first four months in
power. Morsi's passionate and amiable words initially won him sympathy and
respect, but his poor rhetoric, full of digressions and redundancy, did not
serve him well for too long. If Egyptians wanted Mubarak to speak to them more
than he did, they soon began wondering whether Morsi should speak less than he
did.
Too
many impromptu speeches and gestures can, indeed, be very detrimental to
unsophisticated politicians. In a span of just a few months, Morsi made
numerous blunders in public that tarnished his image as a statesman.
Impatiently glancing at his watch during a press conference with the German
chancellor Angela Merkel, adjusting his private parts in front of cameras while
meeting with the Australian prime minister, and addressing an audience of
scientists with a speech that included seven factual and scientific errors evoked
both laughter and fury. Furthermore, Morsi's frequent use of difficult-to-decipher
metaphors left his audience both bewildered and perturbed. On one occasion,
Morsi said: "If the monkey died, what shall the monkey man do?" On
another, he drew a vague analogy between the kitsch classic movie "Planet
of Apes" and Egypt's transition to democracy.
To
be sure, Morsi's persona is insipid and uninspiring. He certainly lacks
Nasser's charisma, Sadat's flamboyance and Mubarak's caution. Becoming the object
of scorn and mockery certainly contributed to Morsi's quick downfall. A leader,
clearly, starts losing power when he loses people's faith in his ability to
lead.
Morsi's
paranoia of the opposition was certainly aggravated by his heightened perception
of threat. As a rule, threats are the lifeblood of Islamist movements, giving
their existence legitimacy and bolstering their unity and coherence. If threats
did not exist over the MB's 85-year life, they would have likely been created.
The tyrant state and its brutal security arm represented the prime source of
threat for the MB during the long years of repression. Threat perceptions
endured after the group rose to power, only its source changed. To Morsi and
the MBs, the agents of the "deep state" inhibited change from within
the state, and the opposition conspired against his rule from without the state.
Whether real or perceived, these perceptions had an impact on Morsi's
inclination to consolidate power rather than engineer an inclusive democratic
process.
Huge
normative differences between Islamists and secularists also deepened Morsi's
distrust and suspicion of his opponents. Although the MB accepts democracy, it
seems to be less interested in democracy for its own sake than in what it can
achieve. The violence of the earlier generations of the MBs came to an end in 1965,
and the group began to participate in parliamentary elections in the 1980s. This
journey from the bullet to the ballot did not entail a complete adoption of
democratic principles. The Muslim brothers seem to respect the 'procedures' of
democracy (particularly elections) far more than its 'values.' While the former
pave the way to power, the latter stand in contradiction with Islamic law. So
far, Islamists' attempts at bridging the gap between both systems of references
have not been entirely successful, with far-reaching consequences on their
stances toward various political and social questions.
Facing
extraordinary political and economic challenges, post-Mubarak Egypt needed an
extraordinary president. It is unsurprising that Morsi failed the test of
statesmanship; it's surprising how fast he did. His removal from office made
him the second shortest serving Egyptian ruler since Mohamed Ali's reign
(1805-1848), in contrast to his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, who is the second longest
serving Egyptian ruler in the same period. Then again, there is nothing new
under the sun. Over its long and rich history, Egypt has always been the land
of striking contrasts and glaring contradictions.
Nael Shama
*
This article appeared first in Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition) on July
8, 2013.
