Quiet mediation efforts between Egypt and Iran have
been going on for months, seeking to end one of the Middle East’s
longest-running but often-neglected feuds. In May, credible media reports
indicated that Egyptian-Iranian talks had been taking place in Baghdad since
March. Later that month, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq visited both Cairo and
Tehran in what was interpreted as an attempt to broker a reconciliation.
Several Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, have publicly endorsed these efforts.
And an Iranian member of parliament said he expected the talks to culminate in
the restoration of formal ties and pave the way for a meeting between the two
countries’ presidents. For their part, however, Egyptian officials have
maintained a cautious stance on the issue, with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry
saying that the status quo with Iran has not changed.
Relations between Egypt and Iran have been strained
for more than four decades, though tensions have been punctuated by periods of
calm. The strains can be attributed in part to the dramatic events of the late
1970s and early 1980s, when Egypt gave refuge to Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
after his ouster by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Shah lived in Cairo
until his death in 1980, after which he was buried there. In a sign of protest,
Iran’s new rulers cut ties with Egypt. Later, when an Islamist military officer
assassinated then-Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, authorities in
Tehran named a main thoroughfare in the city after him. The bitterness
engendered on both sides went on to poison bilateral relations for some time.
In addition to these symbolic slights, a number of
strategic considerations sustained the rift. After a decade of revolutionary
fervor in Iran created antagonistic relations with almost all its neighbors,
Tehran sought to put an end to its regional isolation. But Egypt, which as a
major U.S. ally in the Middle East receives some $2 billion in security and
economic assistance from Washington every year, felt no urge to mend its ties
with a country whose leaders made a habit of describing the U.S. as “the great
Satan.” By the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt had also developed close political and
economic linkages with the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which
viewed Iran as a security threat.
Longtime Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who ruled
from 1981 to 2011, calculated that cozying up to Iran could jeopardize his
country’s strategic alliance with the U.S. and the West in general, as well as
with the Gulf states. Moreover, facing a fierce Islamist opposition, he felt
uneasy about Iran’s promotion of a transnational form of Islamist activism and suspected
that Tehran aimed to cultivate relations with Egyptian Islamist groups. After
Mubarak was ousted in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed
Morsi sought to reset ties, visiting Tehran in 2012 and receiving Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo the following year. But the short-lived
thaw ended after the rise to power of incumbent President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi
in 2013.
However, a new situation has emerged in the Middle
East in recent years, due to the perception that the U.S. is gradually
retreating from the region. As Washington has reduced its commitments and
shifted its gaze to the Indo-Pacific, regional powers have responded by
diversifying their international partnerships and bolstering their ties with
Russia and China in particular. They have also become less willing to heed U.S.
demands. In March, a historic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran
was brokered by China. In May, Syria was readmitted to the Arab League after an
11-year suspension, despite Washington’s public criticism of the move. In this
context, the Egyptian-Iranian dialogue is part of wider regional reconciliation
efforts over which the U.S. has little control.
There is little doubt that Iran approaches the talks
with Egypt with an eye on mitigating its relative isolation in the Arab world
and undermining U.S. and Israeli efforts to form an anti-Iran Arab front.
Indeed, as the Arab world’s most-populous country, Egypt is the last remaining
major Arab state not to have at least begun to mend its fences with Iran.
Egypt’s motivations are less evident. Surrounded by several potentially
contagious hot spots in Libya, Sudan and Gaza, Cairo has a vested interest in
promoting engagement and moderation across the region. After nearly a decade of
animosity, for instance, Egypt recently patched up its relations with Qatar and
narrowed its differences with Turkey.
The dialogue with Tehran can be seen through this
prism. Cairo is aware of Iran’s influence over Hamas and other Gaza-based
Palestinian factions. From its perspective, an understanding with Iran could be
harnessed to moderate the behavior of these militant groups.
But there is probably more to it than that. Egypt is
in the throes of a severe economic crisis that has cut the value of its
currency in half and disrupted trade flows. Facing an acute foreign currency
shortage, it has sought different forms of financial assistance from
international financial institutions, wealthy oil-rich Gulf states and even
countries like India and war-torn Libya.
Iran, which faces its own economic challenges due to
the impact of U.S. sanctions, has little to offer in the form of direct aid.
But thawed relations could be a boon to Egypt’s tourism sector. Home to dozens
of Shiite holy sites, mosques and shrines, Egypt could attract large numbers of
Iranian visitors—who have been barred from entering the country for decades—if
relations are normalized. That could provide a critical contribution to its
cash-strapped economy. Indeed, a step in this direction was already taken in
March, when Egyptian authorities relaxed visa regulations to allow Iranians
traveling in groups to southern Sinai to obtain visas on arrival. A
rapprochement could also enhance economic cooperation, including in the vital
oil sector.
That said, the restoration of Egyptian-Iranian ties is
not a foregone conclusion, as Egypt is currently treading carefully on this
path. Its influential security agencies vetoed similar moves in the past,
despite the inclination of the country’s senior diplomats to consider
conciliatory options. Additionally, Egypt is keen not to provoke its Gulf
patrons, who have historically looked askance at an Egyptian-Iranian
rapprochement, fearing it would upset the delicate balance of power in the
Gulf. Now that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are also pursuing
détente with Iran, they might lift their objections to Cairo following suit.
If successful, however, the normalization of ties
between Egypt and Iran would once again expose Washington’s diminishing role in
influencing regional dynamics. As the Pax Americana has eroded in the Middle
East over the past decade, local actors have increasingly shaped the contours
of regional politics, often in cooperation with China and Russia. But by far
the biggest loser of such an outcome would be Israel, which feels threatened by
Iran’s nuclear programand considers Tehran and its proxies to be evil forces
with which there can be no compromise. The reintegration of Iran and Syria into
the regional community would only exacerbate Israel’s security concerns.
The recent wave of reconciliation deals in the Middle
East could help deescalate tensions in the region. But for how long? Conflict
is endemic among its states, and periods of peace often turn out to be
transient. But if Egypt and Iran do manage to normalize their relations, it
would at least be a step toward finding out the answer to that question.
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This article appeared first on World Politics Review on July 5, 2023.
