In Search of Balance: Egypt and the Great Powers

 

In his recently-published memoirs, Egypt’s former foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy, painted a clear picture of the prevalent mood inside Egypt’s ruling establishment concerning the country’s stance towards great powers. In the 2000s, he explains, former president Hosni Mubarak and many of his aides “came to believe” that the United States was pushing for a regime change agenda in Egypt. While Mubarak is long gone, Washington’s unsupportive attitude towards the Egyptian government during the events of the Arab Spring consolidated such views among a large number of Egyptian officials and policymakers. Hence, an “extremely widespread” and potent “conspiracy theory” has come to rule the day with regards to Egypt’s international relations. Fahmy was no proponent of this theory, but in a meeting held with senior officials soon after he took on the mantle of minister of foreign affairs in 2013, he put forth what would become the motto of Egyptian foreign policy: “Over-dependence on the United States or any other state is detrimental to our interests”.     

In terms of impact, Egypt’s historic turn to the United States in the aftermath of its 1973 war against Israel was one of the greatest reversals of alliance in the modern history of the Middle East. It paved the way for decades of a deep and multifaceted alliance between the two countries. Since the late 1970s, the US has provided Egypt with at least $80 billion in military and economic aid, cooperated with Cairo in promoting Arab-Israeli peace, combatting terrorism, and evicting Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. Bilateral cooperation also included significant levels of trade and investment, and biannual military exercises. However, the gradual US retreat from the Middle East over the course of the last decade and rising Egyptian concerns about frequent US denunciations of Cairo’s human rights abuses made the alliance look like it had run its course.

Indeed, seeing US assistance suspended or delayed several times from 2013-17 over its human rights record, Cairo decided to diversify its international allies, heavily engaging with the two rising stars on the stage of world politics: Russia and China. Moscow had upgraded its involvement in the Middle East, propping up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and becoming a major player in the Libyan civil conflict. Two months into his presidency, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Moscow. In the following few years, the value of bilateral trade increased, Egypt purchased billions of dollars’ worth of Russian military hardware (including fighter jets and attack helicopters), a Russian industrial zone in Egypt was created, and the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement. Moreover, Russia bought a 30% stake in Egypt’s giant Zohr gas field, and it is currently constructing Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, located on the Mediterranean coast, pursuant to a deal to the tune of $25 billion. Politically, the two countries are apprehensive about the specter of radical Islamist movements, and they see eye-to-eye on developments in both Syria and Libya. Of all these spheres of cooperation, the military one seems to be the most crucial for Cairo. It includes not only the purchase of sophisticated jets and weapons systems, but also military drills and efforts to enhance the interoperability of the two armies.

If military ties cemented Egypt’s relations with Russia, it was economic and business considerations that brought Egypt and China closer together. Egypt had taken notice of China’s coming into bloom as an economic superpower, and a political superpower-in-waiting. Keenness about upgrading its ties with Beijing led to an extensive deepening of bilateral relations over the past few years. Sino-Egyptian ties now involve numerous and frequent presidential meetings, vigorous trade, investment and industrial relations, a vibrant joint economic zone in Egypt’s Suez region, broad participation by Chinese companies in the construction of Egypt’s new capital, and plans for a vital Egyptian participation in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, China has become Egypt’s main trading partner, surpassing the US, Germany and Italy, Egypt’s traditional business partners. Low levels of military and security cooperation have also been put in place in recent years. 

A defining feature of Egyptian foreign policy over the decades was the congruence between its policy towards superpowers on the one hand and domestic economic policies and political plans on the other. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, Nasser’s socialist policies and his quest for regional leadership compelled him to turn to the Soviet bloc. In contrast, Sadat’s  quest in the 1970s for economic development, modernization and peace with Israel dictated closer ties with Western nations, especially the US. 

Today, the picture looks more ambivalent, and the lines have not been clearly drawn. After all, America’s single-superpower moment seems to have passed, but no bipolar or multipolar world structure has yet emerged in its place. Cairo is clearly hedging its bets, wishing to have it all ways: US military aid and diplomatic support, Russian military hardware and Chinese capital. Whether simultaneously courting all parties is a viable policy over the long-run, let alone at what cost, still remains to be seen. President’s al-Sisi’s friendly relationship with US President Donald Trump notwithstanding, the US administration had already threatened to impose sanctions on Egypt if it went ahead with plans to purchase sophisticated fighter jets from Russia. At any rate, if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden makes his way to the White House, Egypt may have to make some hard choices.

 

Nael Shama

* This article appeared first in a dossier titled “Egypt at the Crossroads: Pandemic, Authoritarianism and Geopolitical Aspirations” (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, September 2020).  

Cairo and Moscow: Limits of Alliance

Egyptian-Russian relations have recently been marked by a substantial increase in diplomatic activity amid a media frenzy over a potential arms deal. These developments have given rise to suggestions that Egypt's foreign policy is shifting away from the United States and toward Russia—a major realignment given Egypt's extensive political and military ties with the United States since the 1970s.

The flurry of Egyptian-Russian diplomatic activity in the past months has indeed been remarkable. The visit of Egypt's foreign minister Nabil Fahmy to Moscow in September was followed in October by an unusual visit to Cairo by the Russian intelligence chief, Viackeslav Kondraskou. In November, an Egyptian popular diplomacy delegation that included former diplomats, former MPs, public figures, journalists, and artists visited Moscow to "express appreciation" for Russia's support of the "June 30 revolution,"[1] a Russian warship docked at the port of Alexandria for the first time since 1992, and a high-level Russian delegation including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Cairo to hold talks with their Egyptian counterparts.

The timing and pace of the expansion of bilateral ties with Moscow has been primarily seen against the backdrop of Cairo's relations with the United States, its key strategic ally and military donor. These relations have been bedeviled since the removal of President Mohamed Morsi last July. Although the United States has acknowledged the status quo in Egypt and avoided labeling the regime change as a "coup," it has undertaken a number of punitive measures that produced a chasm between it and Egypt's interim government and defense establishment. Troubled by the bloody crackdown on Morsi's supporters in August, the Obama administration called off the biannual joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise "Bright Star" and halted the delivery of military hardware to Egypt, including F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and tank parts.

The Egyptian rapprochement with Moscow seems to reflect an Egyptian interest in creating balance in its foreign relations by diversifying its alliances and minimizing its heavy reliance on Washington. It is also driven by the rising Russian influence in Middle East politics, particularly in the Syrian conflict, and by a shared Russian-Egyptian interest in combating militant Islamic groups. However, there are a number of reasons why it is highly unlikely that Egypt's leadership aims to substitute Washington with Moscow as its chief international patron.

First, the Cold War's bipolar structure, which allowed developing countries to play superpowers against each other in order to extract political and economic concessions from both, collapsed more than 20 years ago. Russia today is neither capable of supporting Egypt as generously and defiantly as the Soviet Union did in the 1950s and 1960s nor is Egypt as strategically significant to Moscow as it was at the height of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Egypt's leaders certainly realize the constraints imposed by the U.S.-dominated global configuration of power and have repeatedly emphasized that their interest in developing closer ties with Moscow does not come at the expense of their strategic alliance with the United States. Asked by the daily Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa about whether Egypt intends to introduce changes to its alliance with the United States and the European Union, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, said that "Egypt's morals" and political "prudence" do not sanction such maneuvers.[2]

Second, the deep, cumulative effect of more than three decades of close Egyptian-American cooperation, particularly on the military and security fronts, makes such closeness unlikely to fundamentally diminish. Military cooperation between the two countries has developed over the years into a multifaceted program that includes, from the United States, a generous $1.3 billion annual aid package, substantial armaments supplies, training of Egypt's military personnel in the United States, and transfer of technology. Egypt provides the United States with a guarantee of secure naval passage through the Suez Canal, the provision of military facilities, and limited access to Egyptian airfields. The two countries also coproduce weaponry and conduct joint military exercises. Any attempt to dismantle this edifice would be financially costly to the Egyptian military and practically difficult.

The working relationship between Egypt's array of security agencies and their American counterparts is likewise solid and deep-rooted. Joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism intensified after 9/11 and has continued unabated. In a recent interview with the Washington Post, the director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service, Mohamed Farid el-Tohamy, said that he is "in direct contact with [Director] John Brennan at the CIA and the local station chief, more than with any service worldwide."[3] Information sharing with U.S. intelligence agencies is expected to increase in light of the intensification of Egypt's war against militant insurgents in Sinai.

Third, diplomatic relations between any two states are bolstered when the political elites of both countries are tied by like-mindedness and congruence of opinion. One reason behind Egypt's sudden turn to the West in the 1970s was the personal disposition of its leader, Anwar Sadat, who disliked the Soviets, describing them once as a “crude and tasteless people."[4] In contrast, the harmonious friendship American politicians (particularly President Jimmy Carter) developed with Sadat played a substantial role in facilitating the conclusion of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

Despite strong disagreement between Egyptian and American officials over the events accompanying and following the removal of Morsi, there is nonetheless a deep attachment to, and even admiration for, the values and ethos of the West among the majority of Egypt's top brass. None of them witnessed the golden age of Egyptian-Soviet relations, which was forged in the mid-1950s and lasted until the mid-1970s. El-Sisi was only 18 when Sadat, in 1972, expelled the Soviet military advisors who had been stationed in Egypt since the country’s disastrous defeat by Israel in 1967, effectively ending what had represented the zenith of Egyptian-Soviet military cooperation. Egypt's senior military officers thus have no special affection for Russia or its military doctrines. The majority of them, including el-Sisi, received training in the United States and/or have participated in joint military exercises with the United States.

Fourth, major foreign policy realignments generally follow major domestic political changes, such as profound revolution, key changes in leadership, or the restructuring of socioeconomic policies. The change of regime in Egypt this past summer did not establish a new state with new institutions, doctrines, and aspirations, but rather brought back the old state, reviving its security apparatus and reinforcing its deep-rooted patterns of alliances. The massive crackdown on protestors, the return of Mubarak loyalists to positions of prominence, and the restoration of the alliance between the security apparatus, the bureaucracy, and the business community attest to the return of much of the pre-2011 state. And, as Egypt's foreign policy did not witness much change under the rule of the transitional SCAF government and then under Morsi, it is unrealistic to expect a revolutionary change in that policy today.

It can be argued that Egypt's flirtation with Russia does not mean a shift in the country's foreign policy away from the United States as much as an attempt to induce the United States to shift its Egypt policy back to where it was before. In fact, Mubarak often employed this tactic of getting closer to competitors or enemies of the United States, such as Iran, in order to pressure the United States and to arouse concern among American politicians about the prospect of losing Egypt, encouraging them to amend unfavorable policies.

Whether one looks at Egypt's relations with Russia and the United States from a geostrategic standpoint, the perspective of political elites, or the angle of domestic political structure, the conclusion reached is the same: Egypt seeks closer ties with Russia, but it remains allied to the United States, the current crisis in bilateral relations notwithstanding. Egypt's relationship with Washington has indeed bent many times over the past decades, but it has never broken. A massive change in Egypt's foreign policy behavior will only occur if a massive change takes place in the underlying determinants of that behavior.

Nael Shama

* This article appeared first on the website of the Middle East Institute on December 16, 2013.  

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[1] Joel Gulhane, "Popular Delegation Travels to Russia to Express Appreciation," Daily News Egypt, 7 November 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/07/popular-delegation-travels-to-russia-to-express-appreciation/.

[2] "El-Sisi to the Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa: Those Who Realize the Magnitude of Egypt's Problems Will Not Enter the Presidential Race," Al-Araby, 21 November 2013, http://www.alarabynews.com/?p=126642.

[3] David Ignatius, "The Future of Egypt's Intelligence Service," The Washington Post, 11 November 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/11/11/the-future-of-egypts-intelligence-service/.

[4] Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 166.

Beyond Muslim Rage

What often lies at the center of media attention isn’t necessarily the aspect worth our consideration and thought. The media coverage of the recent anti-US demonstrations in the Middle East is a good case in point. It focused on the details of the anti-Islamic film "Innocence of Muslims" (an obscure film which mocked Islam and its Prophet Muhammad), and the furious, in some cases violent, response of Muslims, but ignored other more important aspects.

To a large extent, the protestors, the real actors on the stage, have disappeared from the radar of political commentary. While still recognizing the significance of analyzing states, institutions, and power games among nations, the individual remains a crucial unit of analysis mostly overlooked by today's mass media as they feverishly compete with each other to hunt for dramatic news, in order to increase their ratings and attract more viewers and advertisers.

Infotainment, merging information with entertainment, distorts the news and doesn’t dig deep to provide thorough coverage and in-depth analysis. The commercial, profit-driven newspapers and TV channels reduced the anti-film protestors to unthinking thugs, who are full of hatred, and who intend, if given the chance, to inflict harm upon non-Muslims.

These negative, racial stereotypes are misleading. There are many other perspectives that sound journalistic coverage can use to analyze the behavior of the angry protestors who stormed US embassies in Egypt, Libya and other Muslim countries recently.  

First, protestors were not only furious because they felt their faith had been insulted. This is just a fraction of the truth. The film was, undoubtedly, provocative and disrespectful of Islam. The deep-rooted resentment of US foreign policy weighed heavily, whether consciously or not, on the minds of those who burned the US flag and threw stones on its embassies in Cairo and Benghazi. US support of Israel, its apparent indifference to the plight of the Palestinians, and its overall hegemonic policies in the Middle East have bred hostility to the US and deep suspicion of its intentions. Had the film been produced in, say, Ghana, Ukraine or Brazil, countries whose past interactions with the Muslim world haven’t been marred with distrust and ill-feelings, the response of Muslims would have been muted.  

 

Secondly, the violent clashes that lasted for days in the Egyptian capital cannot be understood without taking into consideration the decades-long popular enmity with the security forces. Egypt's gigantic security apparatus has had a shameful record of intimidation, torture, and misconduct for decades. The eruption of the 2011 revolution on January 25, National Police Day, came as no surprise. During the revolution, moreover, hundreds of mostly young Egyptians were brutally killed at the hands of the police. The painful moments of their death cannot be easily erased from the memories of their families and friends.   

Accordingly, going into battle with security forces has become a national hobby to many of Egypt's disgruntled youth who seek retaliation. As the footage of the recent clashes show, what started as a protest against the insult to Prophet Mohamed quickly turned into a collective fight-or-flight response with the police.  

Thirdly, the overwhelming sense of defeat as a civilization felt by Arab people left a deep scar on their collective psyche. Despite several ambitious development attempts in the past two centuries, progress has generally eluded the Arab world, as its people watched Western nations and Asian tigers make great leaps in economic development and scientific innovation.  

The contrast between a glorious past and a miserable present led Egyptians to ask a number of vital soul-searching questions, such as: Why is the scientific and economic gap between us and the First World so enormous? And why has it widened over the past years? People normally seek spiritual solace in times of crisis. Many Egyptians resorted to Islam, finding comfort and consolation in the teachings and promises of their faith.

To be sure, the question of identity figures prominently in the actions, reactions, attitudes and worldviews of young Arabs and Egyptians. The aversion to Western culture, particularly consumerism and sexual liberties, is commonplace in the Middle East. Westernization has been on the rise for many decades. It has permeated nearly all aspects of life, including culture, education, and lifestyle. Islamists perceive this as a threat to the unity and purity of the Muslim community and act accordingly. Interestingly, the Sudanese protestors broke into the German embassy, not the American, for they perceive the West as superior, homogeneous and hostile. An attack on Islam is seen as a direct attack by the 'other' on their safe spiritual haven that must be resisted.

Shallow media coverage perpetuates stereotyping and prejudice. We should expose it, challenge it, and change it.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Global Times (China) on September 26, 2012.