What Does the UAE Want in the Red Sea?

The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates offers a curious case study for scholars of international relations: a small state with a tiny population and historically little presence on the world stage, but with outsized – and seemingly ever-expanding – ambitions. Over the past decade, while consolidating its status as a regional financial center and international business hub, the UAE has quietly become a rising military power in the Middle East.

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (center) attends the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia May 21, 2017. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

Since the watershed of the Arab Spring, the UAE has pursued an increasingly assertive and interventionist foreign policy, the effects of which are most evident in the Red Sea basin and Horn of Africa. Here, the UAE has sought to become a major political actor, maintaining a formidable military presence, handing out lavish economic aid and taking on the role of kingmaker and peace broker. The rigorous efforts of the UAE in the Red Sea basin and the Horn of Africa region included establishing military bases; constructing, refurbishing and running ports; providing maritime services; and building police stations, health clinics, schools and sewage infrastructure for the indigenous populations. Today, the UAE operates ports in four of the seven countries bordering the Red Sea (Egypt, Somalia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia), and military bases in Yemen, Eritrea and Somaliland. The UAE’s presence in the region also includes the establishment of a modern military base in Berbera (the center of trade traffic in East Africa and the largest port in Somalialand), an airfield, deep-water port facilities and logistics support area in Eritrea’s Assab, a formidable naval presence in two islands in Bab el-Mandab Strait and a plan to set up a base for military training in the Yemeni Island of Socotra, located in the Arabian Sea south of the Yemeni mainland. 

The UAE has been ratcheting up its economic activities in the Red Sea basin as well. In 2000, Dubai government-owned, Dubai-based port operator DP World won a 20-year concession to operate the Port of Djibouti. Its efforts in Egypt began around a decade ago when it took over the operation, development and management of Ain Sokhna Port, crucial for being the closest port to the Egyptian capital, Cairo. Last year, it signed an agreement with the Suez Canal Authority to establish a company that would develop an area of 95 kilometers in the Ain Sokhna area. In Saudi Arabia, DP World operates the South Container Terminal at the Jeddah Islamic Port, and in 2017 it won a contract to develop the entire port, in support of Saudi Vision 2030 and the $500 billion NEOM mega project.

A shipment of grain is unloaded at Hodeidah, Yemen August 5, 2018. Emirati troops are waging an amphibious assault on the Yemeni Red Sea port. REUTERS/Abduljabbar Zeyad

These port deals were won through negotiation, but elsewhere the UAE has employed more forceful measures. The UAE has used its heavy involvement in the Yemen conflict (as part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels) to expand its geopolitical power in the region. In 2015, UAE-backed forces seized the port of Aden – once the British Empire’s busiest port – from the Houthis. In 2016, the UAE captured the ports of Mukalla and Ash-Shihr, about 300 and 375 miles east of Aden, respectively, as well as two strategically-located islands in the Bab el-Mandab Strait. Emirati troops secured the Red Sea port of Mokha in 2017, and are now engaged in an amphibious assault on Hodeidah, the only major Yemeni port not yet under Emirati control.

But why has the UAE shifted from being a buyer of security to a supplier of it? It could be argued that the UAE’s foray into East Africa is due to the importance of the Red Sea as a vital artery for the transportation of the country’s hydrocarbon exports. Through its two narrow chokepoints – the Suez Canal in the north and the Bab el-Mandab Strait in the south – around 3.9 and 4.8 million oil barrels, respectively, flowed every day in 2016. Control of seaports, moreover, helps in opening markets, generating economic opportunities and, in times of conflict, projecting military power.    

The Emirati leadership’s obsession with the threat of Islamism certainly plays a role. Not only does the ruling elite (particularly Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the UAE’s de facto ruler) harbor a deep sense of enmity toward militant Islamists, it perceives them as an existential threat to its domestic authority. The UAE has likely been propelled to adopt a policy of direct intervention because a number of militant Islamist groups are currently active in East Africa, including the Bosaso-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami group, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, the Justice and Equality Movement and Al-Takfir wal-Hijra group in Sudan, and Al-Shabab in Somalia.

Yet, there’s more to it than that. The passing on of leadership in 2004 from Sheikh Zayed, the founder of the state, to his heirs, Khalifa and Mohammed, seems to be the real dynamic behind policy change. While Zayed favored dialogue, quiet diplomacy and non-entanglement in the quarrels of other states, his successors are more proactive and daring. Their actions are sometimes tainted with an element of recklessness. Awash with cash and ambition, they have sought to turn the country into a regional power with outstanding military might, a little Sparta on the Persian Gulf.   

Several regional developments have emboldened the Emiratis. These include the vacuum created by the debilitation of the Arab world’s heavyweights; the formation of a crescent of instability in Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen; the ossification of the Gulf Cooperation Council; the shift in American geostrategic priorities; the UAE’s entanglement in the Yemeni conflict; and the rivalry with Iran. Still, in the oil-rich Gulf states, decision-making processes are highly personalized, leaders replace institutions, and ego-centered dynamics shape much of the political output. So without the change at the helm of the UAE, old perceptions and policies would have probably remained unchanged. Bent on punching above its weight, the UAE has under the new bold leadership become, as one researcher pointed out, “a small state with a big ego.” Its long arms have not only reached into the poorer states of East Africa, but also into Syria, Libya, Egypt and other Middle Eastern states.  

Arab politics is undergoing massive changes. After decades of fixating on big states, researchers of the international relations of the Middle East ought to keep a close eye on small states, such as Qatar and the UAE, who are no longer young, vulnerable and inward-looking. While the big Arab states are becoming slow to think and act, these smaller states are dynamic, agile and highly influential. The UAE’s security policies in particular will continue to have a huge impact on developments in nearly all of the region’s hot spots, including Yemen, Libya, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Its success last month in effecting a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, who had been engaged in hot and cold war for two decades, is the latest proof of that influence.

As the grounds are cracking, and a new regional order is rising, it is all too crucial to pay high attention to the new agents of power.   

Nael Shama  

* This essay appeared in Reuters Opinion  on August 27, 2018 under the title “Ambitious UAE Flexes Military Muscle”

* Photo: Reuters .

The Dilemmas of Egyptian Foreign Policy

Although Egypt is a political powerhouse in the Middle East, its foreign policy hardly reflects that. Under its longtime president Hosni Mubarak, Egypt receded into a long phase of quietism and withdrawal. Mubarak is gone, but 'Mubarakism without Mubarak' has persisted, even under the short-lived rule of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi. As soon as he steps forth into the presidency, Egypt's new ruler, Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, will find himself on the horns of multiple foreign policy dilemmas. The way he tackles them will shape the substance, orientation and purpose of Egypt's foreign policy in the near future.

1- Resources and Aspirations

Egypt traditionally sees itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. In his manifesto The Philosophy of the Revolution, former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser (ruled 1954-1970) rambled on about a leading role in the region that is "wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it." This role, he added, "should at last settle down, weary and worn out, on our frontiers beckoning us to move, to dress up for it and to perform it since there is nobody else who could do so."[i] The foreign policy of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, particularly the go-it-alone peace deal with Israel, led to Egypt's ostracization in the region. But Sadat was confident that Egypt's isolation in its sphere of influence was only temporary, and that Arabs were bound to follow in its footsteps. Although Mubarak was not interested in the flamboyance of leadership, preferring instead to be a distant, bureaucratic president of a status quo state, he still clung to a vital Egyptian involvement in the Palestinian problem.

The recent rise of Al-Sisi in Egyptian politics revived nationalist sentiments and ambitions after decades of dormancy. Fostered by state institutions and the pro-regime mass media, ostensibly as a bulwark against Islamism, these nationalist sentiments bred a wave of great expectations. On Egypt's cafes and television shows, analogies are frequently drawn between Al-Sisi and Nasser, the leader whose reign witnessed the most dynamic and change-oriented Egyptian foreign policy in modern times. Great hopes are pinned on Al-Sisi's leadership. He will be another Nasser, his supporters wish, taking on the mantle of leadership, defying international powers and restoring Egypt's wounded prestige in the world.

But times have massively changed. Capitalizing on political determination and the availability of resources, Nasser could, with relative ease, fund revolutionary movements in Africa, provide support for Arab states against Israel and lead the developing world, under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement, against the plots of superpowers. His electrifying charisma added an element of inspiration and magic to his foreign policy. For more than ten years (1956-1967), the role Nasser had envisaged as a young officer rested indeed on Egypt's shores.  

Egypt's dire economic situation today inhibits its ability to play the same role. Three years of political turmoil took a great toll on its economy, slowing down economic growth and foreign investment flows and reducing tourism and export earnings. In foreign affairs, the economic crisis increased Egypt's vulnerability and deepened its dependence on Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, who together provided more than $20 billion in various forms of assistance to Egypt since Morsi's ouster.[ii] As a result, Egypt's foreign policy has been increasingly wedded to the interests of Gulf states, with less autonomy and a narrow margin of maneuverability being the outcome.  

The change in Egypt's stance toward the Syrian conflict is proof of this. Morsi had vocally supported the Syrian "revolution." He severed diplomatic ties with Syria's regime during a rally in which hardline Islamists called for "jihad" against Bashar al-Assad. But a few weeks after the coup, Egypt's Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy announced that Egypt is reevaluating its relationship with Syria, adding that Morsi's decision to cut diplomatic ties with Damascus would be "re-examined."[iii] In the following months, Cairo's policy on Syria came closer to that endorsed by its Gulf allies, indicating a policy that is "shaped by donors."[iv]

Al-Sisi must find a creative answer to this predicament: How to reconcile needed economic aid from donors with an independent foreign policy? Without aid, Egypt's ailing economy will continue to suffer, but for a populist president like Al-Sisi, dependency on - or worse, acquiescence to - the small oil Sheikhdoms will come at a huge cost: diminished popularity and reminiscence of the notorious days of Mubarak, not Nasser.       

2- Authoritarianism and the Outside World

The ouster of Morsi, and the subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), unleashed all the demons of the authoritarian state, which had been dormant since Mubarak's overthrow in 2011. In the name of combating terrorism and restoring the 'prestige' of the state, thousands have been killed and arrested in the span of a few months, an Orwellian protest law was issued and dissent has been quashed using all possible means. Such draconian measures cannot take place in today's globalized, interconnected world, which attaches great importance to liberties and human rights issues, without international ramifications.  

Indeed, widespread human rights abuses in Egypt elicited major responses from various international players. The African Union, for instance, suspended Egypt's membership days after Morsi's removal in July 2013. As a result, Egypt (along with international pariahs Zimbabwe and Sudan) was last January excluded from attending the high-profile US-Africa Leaders Summit, which will take place in Washington next August. Also, a joint declaration was issued last March by 27 member states in the United Nations Human Rights Council, expressing concern over Egypt's excessive use of force against protestors, and asking the Egyptian authorities to hold those responsible for the abuses to account. In the same vein, the outcry of international journalists over the trial of the journalists of Al-Jazeera's Cairo office continues unabated, causing embarrassment for the Egyptian government in major world capitals.  

Al-Sisi will soon be caught between internal and external allies. A large segment of his power base rejects any conciliation with the MB, and advocates continuing – or even escalating – the crackdown on dissidents, Islamists and revolutionary youth alike. Moreover, any attempt to reform state institutions, especially the gigantic security apparatus, will be resisted by a state that has become too old and too corrupt to change its notorious ways. On the other hand, blatant authoritarianism at home will continue to strain Egypt's relations with the outside world, especially the United States and European countries, undermining foreign aid, investment and Egypt's international reputation.

3- Few Allies, Many Antagonists

Egypt has few allies in the region: the Gulf states. With the exception of Qatar, which dances to a different drum, these states have an abundance of petrodollars and harbor an abundance of antipathy towards Islamist movements - the perfect allies of today's Egypt. Conversely, because of their support for the MB, Turkey, Qatar and Hamas are seen in Cairo as barefaced adversaries. Egypt's relations with neighboring Libya and Sudan are cordial, but fraught with tension. The Sudan did not toe the line of Egypt over Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam, which Egypt regards as a menace to its share of Nile water. The inability of Libya's government to curb arms trafficking across the border, and to control the Islamic militias that are hostile to Egypt's regime, and the latter's reluctance to extradite members of Gaddafi's regime who live in Egypt are causes of friction in Egyptian-Libyan ties.[v] Egypt's formal diplomatic relations with Iran have been severed since 1980, and their restoration is nowhere on the horizon.          

Egypt therefore is semi-isolated in the region where it is centered, the Middle East. Proximate states such as Libya, Qatar, Sudan and Hamas – and, in the wider region, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia – are not allies. They all fall within the scope of hostile, unfriendly or, at best, neutral states. In response to this inimical milieu, the strategy of the post-Morsi regime has rested on escalation. Cairo expelled the Turkish ambassador in November, recalled its ambassador to Doha in January, and an Egyptian court labeled Hamas a terrorist organization in March. Media assaults on Ankara, Doha and Hamas have verged on hysteria, reflecting how distant reconciliation is.     

However, not only cannot a strategy that is premised on confrontation survive, especially for a pivotal country with leadership aspirations, but it could also be very detrimental. For instance, suffocating Hamas for too long might drive its radical elements to forge ties with the Islamist insurgents in Sinai. Also, Egypt will not be able to mediate between the belligerent Palestinian factions, Fateh and Hamas, or between Israel and the Palestinians if it continues to boycott Hamas. Moreover, the legitimacy of Egypt's new president will be undercut if he is seen at home as colluding with Israel against the besieged and poverty-stricken Palestinians. Likewise, a protracted state of tension with two regional powers like Turkey and Iran is neither constructive nor conducive to regional stability.

Which strategic formula will Al-Sisi embrace to confront these threats, break out of this isolation, and restore Egypt's stature in the region? Escalation may undermine Egypt's national security and ignite a new Arab Cold War, to whose ill winds no state would be immune, but inaction could be costly, too. So will Al-Sisi manage to strike a balance between both courses of action, with skill, intellect and prescience?

Foreign policy victories and failures were kingmakers and breakers in Egypt. The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the 'Crossing' in 1973 made Nasser and Sadat national heroes. In contrast, the 1967 defeat heralded Nasser's political demise, and Sadat's separate peace with Israel 10 years later precipitated his assassination. Undoubtedly, Al-Sisi will soon be put to serious tests. Will his foreign policy be his crowning glory or his knockout punch?       

Nael M. Shama

* This article appeared first on AhramOnline on June 11, 2014.

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[i] Gamal Abdel-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Cairo: Information Agency, 1954, p. 68. (in Arabic)

[ii]  "Gulf Aid to Egypt Since 30 June More than $20 Billion: El-Sisi" AhramOnline, 6 May 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/100653/Egypt/Politics-/Gulf-aid-to-Egypt-since--June-more-than--billion-E.aspx.

[iii] "Egypt to Re-evaluate Relations with Syria," Al-Jazeera.com, 21 July 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201372013042628686.html.

[iv] Michele Dunne, "Foreign Policy Shaped by Donors," Sada, 3 April 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/03/foreign-policy-shaped-by-donors/h6z0.

[v] Mohamed Elmenshawy, "Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations," Middle East Institute, 21 March 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/bad-neighbor-good-neighbor-libya-egypt-relations. 

Cairo and Moscow: Limits of Alliance

Egyptian-Russian relations have recently been marked by a substantial increase in diplomatic activity amid a media frenzy over a potential arms deal. These developments have given rise to suggestions that Egypt's foreign policy is shifting away from the United States and toward Russia—a major realignment given Egypt's extensive political and military ties with the United States since the 1970s.

The flurry of Egyptian-Russian diplomatic activity in the past months has indeed been remarkable. The visit of Egypt's foreign minister Nabil Fahmy to Moscow in September was followed in October by an unusual visit to Cairo by the Russian intelligence chief, Viackeslav Kondraskou. In November, an Egyptian popular diplomacy delegation that included former diplomats, former MPs, public figures, journalists, and artists visited Moscow to "express appreciation" for Russia's support of the "June 30 revolution,"[1] a Russian warship docked at the port of Alexandria for the first time since 1992, and a high-level Russian delegation including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Cairo to hold talks with their Egyptian counterparts.

The timing and pace of the expansion of bilateral ties with Moscow has been primarily seen against the backdrop of Cairo's relations with the United States, its key strategic ally and military donor. These relations have been bedeviled since the removal of President Mohamed Morsi last July. Although the United States has acknowledged the status quo in Egypt and avoided labeling the regime change as a "coup," it has undertaken a number of punitive measures that produced a chasm between it and Egypt's interim government and defense establishment. Troubled by the bloody crackdown on Morsi's supporters in August, the Obama administration called off the biannual joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise "Bright Star" and halted the delivery of military hardware to Egypt, including F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and tank parts.

The Egyptian rapprochement with Moscow seems to reflect an Egyptian interest in creating balance in its foreign relations by diversifying its alliances and minimizing its heavy reliance on Washington. It is also driven by the rising Russian influence in Middle East politics, particularly in the Syrian conflict, and by a shared Russian-Egyptian interest in combating militant Islamic groups. However, there are a number of reasons why it is highly unlikely that Egypt's leadership aims to substitute Washington with Moscow as its chief international patron.

First, the Cold War's bipolar structure, which allowed developing countries to play superpowers against each other in order to extract political and economic concessions from both, collapsed more than 20 years ago. Russia today is neither capable of supporting Egypt as generously and defiantly as the Soviet Union did in the 1950s and 1960s nor is Egypt as strategically significant to Moscow as it was at the height of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Egypt's leaders certainly realize the constraints imposed by the U.S.-dominated global configuration of power and have repeatedly emphasized that their interest in developing closer ties with Moscow does not come at the expense of their strategic alliance with the United States. Asked by the daily Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa about whether Egypt intends to introduce changes to its alliance with the United States and the European Union, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, said that "Egypt's morals" and political "prudence" do not sanction such maneuvers.[2]

Second, the deep, cumulative effect of more than three decades of close Egyptian-American cooperation, particularly on the military and security fronts, makes such closeness unlikely to fundamentally diminish. Military cooperation between the two countries has developed over the years into a multifaceted program that includes, from the United States, a generous $1.3 billion annual aid package, substantial armaments supplies, training of Egypt's military personnel in the United States, and transfer of technology. Egypt provides the United States with a guarantee of secure naval passage through the Suez Canal, the provision of military facilities, and limited access to Egyptian airfields. The two countries also coproduce weaponry and conduct joint military exercises. Any attempt to dismantle this edifice would be financially costly to the Egyptian military and practically difficult.

The working relationship between Egypt's array of security agencies and their American counterparts is likewise solid and deep-rooted. Joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism intensified after 9/11 and has continued unabated. In a recent interview with the Washington Post, the director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service, Mohamed Farid el-Tohamy, said that he is "in direct contact with [Director] John Brennan at the CIA and the local station chief, more than with any service worldwide."[3] Information sharing with U.S. intelligence agencies is expected to increase in light of the intensification of Egypt's war against militant insurgents in Sinai.

Third, diplomatic relations between any two states are bolstered when the political elites of both countries are tied by like-mindedness and congruence of opinion. One reason behind Egypt's sudden turn to the West in the 1970s was the personal disposition of its leader, Anwar Sadat, who disliked the Soviets, describing them once as a “crude and tasteless people."[4] In contrast, the harmonious friendship American politicians (particularly President Jimmy Carter) developed with Sadat played a substantial role in facilitating the conclusion of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

Despite strong disagreement between Egyptian and American officials over the events accompanying and following the removal of Morsi, there is nonetheless a deep attachment to, and even admiration for, the values and ethos of the West among the majority of Egypt's top brass. None of them witnessed the golden age of Egyptian-Soviet relations, which was forged in the mid-1950s and lasted until the mid-1970s. El-Sisi was only 18 when Sadat, in 1972, expelled the Soviet military advisors who had been stationed in Egypt since the country’s disastrous defeat by Israel in 1967, effectively ending what had represented the zenith of Egyptian-Soviet military cooperation. Egypt's senior military officers thus have no special affection for Russia or its military doctrines. The majority of them, including el-Sisi, received training in the United States and/or have participated in joint military exercises with the United States.

Fourth, major foreign policy realignments generally follow major domestic political changes, such as profound revolution, key changes in leadership, or the restructuring of socioeconomic policies. The change of regime in Egypt this past summer did not establish a new state with new institutions, doctrines, and aspirations, but rather brought back the old state, reviving its security apparatus and reinforcing its deep-rooted patterns of alliances. The massive crackdown on protestors, the return of Mubarak loyalists to positions of prominence, and the restoration of the alliance between the security apparatus, the bureaucracy, and the business community attest to the return of much of the pre-2011 state. And, as Egypt's foreign policy did not witness much change under the rule of the transitional SCAF government and then under Morsi, it is unrealistic to expect a revolutionary change in that policy today.

It can be argued that Egypt's flirtation with Russia does not mean a shift in the country's foreign policy away from the United States as much as an attempt to induce the United States to shift its Egypt policy back to where it was before. In fact, Mubarak often employed this tactic of getting closer to competitors or enemies of the United States, such as Iran, in order to pressure the United States and to arouse concern among American politicians about the prospect of losing Egypt, encouraging them to amend unfavorable policies.

Whether one looks at Egypt's relations with Russia and the United States from a geostrategic standpoint, the perspective of political elites, or the angle of domestic political structure, the conclusion reached is the same: Egypt seeks closer ties with Russia, but it remains allied to the United States, the current crisis in bilateral relations notwithstanding. Egypt's relationship with Washington has indeed bent many times over the past decades, but it has never broken. A massive change in Egypt's foreign policy behavior will only occur if a massive change takes place in the underlying determinants of that behavior.

Nael Shama

* This article appeared first on the website of the Middle East Institute on December 16, 2013.  

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[1] Joel Gulhane, "Popular Delegation Travels to Russia to Express Appreciation," Daily News Egypt, 7 November 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/07/popular-delegation-travels-to-russia-to-express-appreciation/.

[2] "El-Sisi to the Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa: Those Who Realize the Magnitude of Egypt's Problems Will Not Enter the Presidential Race," Al-Araby, 21 November 2013, http://www.alarabynews.com/?p=126642.

[3] David Ignatius, "The Future of Egypt's Intelligence Service," The Washington Post, 11 November 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/11/11/the-future-of-egypts-intelligence-service/.

[4] Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 166.

السياسة الخارجية المصرية: الآمال والمعوقات

 

ارتفعت الآمال إلى عنان السماء بعد ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير بإمكانية حدوث تغيير جوهري في السياسة الخارجية المصرية بعد عقود من الضعف، وذبول الطموح، وهيمنة رد الفعل على الفعل. إلا أن الآمال والطموحات تصطدم - كما هو الحال غالباً - بمعطيات الواقع وقيوده. وكما تتيح الأوضاع الجديدة بعد الثورة فرصاً واسعة لإعادة بعث السياسة الخارجية، وإحياء دور مصر الريادي في المنطقة والعالم، فإنها حبلى أيضاً بقيود وتحديات شتى ينبغي على صانع السياسة الالتفات إليها، والتعاطي معها بكفاءة، إن كان يبغي تغييراً واضحاً في الأداء، لا مجرد تغيير طفيف في النص المصاحب لأنغام اللحن القديم الرتيب.

ثمة ارتباط أصيل بين وحدة ومنعة وسلامة الجبهة الداخلية وبين قيام سياسة خارجية ناجعة، فذاك السبب لا غنى عنه في سبيل الوصول لتلك النتيجة. والآن، وبينما يحلم المصريون بتغيير أداء السياسة الخارجية المصرية إلى الأفضل، تواجه سفينة الوطن ثلاث تحديات رئيسية، ينبثق عن كل منها سؤال محوري ينبغي التوقف عنده والإجابة عليه.    

أولاً، من الصعب الحديث عن سياسة خارجية فاعلة ونشطة بدون أن تدعم هذه السياسة قاعدة إقتصادية قوية ومرنة. فلا توجد سياسة خارجية بلا تكلفة، تستقطع من الاقتصاد الوطني لخدمة الأمن القومي وتحقيق الأهداف العليا للوطن. لذلك فإن الأزمة الإقتصادية الحالية تخصم بلا شك من رصيد السياسة الخارجية، وتحد من قدرتها على الفعل والتأثير. والحلول التي تراهن عليها القيادة الحالية لا تختلف كثيراً عما سبق الرهان عليه في عقود الانكفاء والتبعية. إذ تعتمد كما هو واضح على القروض والاستثمارات الخارجية، مما يزيد من الاعتماد على الخارج، ويقوض استقلالية القرار المصري وحريته في الحركة.

الازدهار الإقتصادي إذن شرط من شروط كفاءة وفاعلية أي سياسة خارجية، وهو شرط لا يمكن الاستعاضة عنه بالخطب الرنانة، وفنون العلاقات العامة، والارتكان إلى أمجاد الماضي. وكما هو معلوم فإن تركيا لم تطور سياستها الخارجية وترتقي بطموحاتها في الإقليم في العقد الأخير إلا بعد بنائها أساساً اقتصادياً متيناً، يدعم ويصون هذا التوجه الجديد.

يثور في ضوء هذه المعطيات سؤال مهم: كيف سيتمكن صانع القرار المصري من إدارة السياسة الخارجية بأقصى كفاءة ممكنة في ظل شح الموارد، وتردي الأوضاع الاجتماعية، وازدياد الحاجة إلى رأس المال الأجنبي؟   

ثانياً، كلما اتسعت قاعدة التأييد السياسي للنظام القائم، كلما زادت قدرة هذا النظام على تنفيذ سياسة خارجية ناجحة. ولعلنا نذكر أن قوى العدوان الثلاثي على مصر في 1956 راهنت على أن التدخل العسكري كفيل بفض الالتفاف الشعبي حول القيادة وإسقاط النظام، وفشل الرهان نتيجة لتوحد الشعب مع قيادته في معركة التنمية والاستقلال الوطني. أما الوضع اليوم فجد مختلف، فالرئيس محمد مرسي نجح في الانتخابات الرئاسية بفارق ضئيل، والاستقطاب بين المعسكرين المدني والإسلامي على أشده، والوئام الطائفي المستقر منذ قرون يتعرض لأشد المحن. ولا يوجد ما يشير إلى أن هناك رغبة رئاسية في وقف التناحر المدمر بين القوى السياسية المختلفة، ولا في اتخاذ إجراءات فاعلة لتهدئة التوتر الطائفى، ولا في خلق إجماع وطني على مشروع سياسي وتنموي تتضافر فيه كل الجهود في تناغم لخلق نهضة حقيقية.

الانقسام الداخلي معطل للصعود الخارجي، والعاصفة القادمة ستهب على الأرجح من اتجاه الخلاف حول الدستور الجديد، الذي أجج الاستقطاب الدائر حول بعض مواده بالفعل من نير التناحر بين القوى السياسية المختلفة، وزاد من هوة الخلاف بين الرئاسة وقطاعات واسعة من الشعب.

الدور الخارجي النشيط يجلب معه بالضرورة مواجهات ومعارك، ومعارك السياسة الخارجية تستلزم حداً أدنى من التوافق الداخلي، وقدراً معقولاً من تأييد القيادة، ونصيباً أصيلاً من الشرعية  السياسية والمشروعية القانونية. والسؤال هنا: هل يمكن لدولة أن تحلق سياستها الخارجية وأوضاعها الداخلية على هذا النحو من التشتت والانقسام؟ 

ثالثاً، نجاح سياستنا الخارجية في تفاعلها تعاوناً وصراعاً مع القوى الأخرى على الساحتين الإقليمية والدولية خاضع لموازين القوى بين مصر وهذه القوى. فقدرات أي دولة في الساحة الدولية أمر نسبي يقاس بالمقارنة بقدرات الدول الأخرى. والبديهي في هذا المقام رفع دعائم الدولة، وتعضيد أوجه القوة، وسد مكامن النقص، وعلاج أوجه القصور.  

وتمثل الأوضاع الأمنية الغير مستقرة في سيناء أحد هذه المواضع التي تحتاج لرأب الصدع فوراً ودون إبطاء. إذ تشكل تهديداً سياسياً وأمنياً خطيراً في بقعة جغرافية لا تحتمل أي تهاون أو تقصير، وتغري أطرافاً خارجية إما لاستخدام هذه الورقة لفرض أمر واقع لا يصب في المصلحة الوطنية المصرية وسيادتها على كامل ترابها، أو لاستقطاع  تنازلات من مصر في قضايا حيوية أخرى. كما أن استعادة الأمن في سيناء اختبار لمدى قدرة النظام الجديد على التعامل مع الأزمات المعقدة بحنكة السياسة وحزم السلاح، ومن ثم سيعزز نجاحه من سمعته في الساحة الدولية.

لكن المؤشرات الأولى غير مشجعة، فالانفلات الأمني قائم رغم تعزيزات الشرطة والجيش، والمعلومات عن حجم الداء ومدى النجاح في استئصاله إما غائبة أو متضاربة، والسيناريوهات الكابوسية تملأ صفحات الجرائد وأحاديث الأثير. والسؤال هنا: إلى أي مدى يمكن أن تؤثر الأوضاع الأمنية المضطربة في سيناء على السياسة الخارجية المصرية باتجاه إسرائيل وحركة حماس وملف الصراع العربي-الإسرائيلي بشكل عام؟

الأزمة الاقتصادية الطاحنة، والانقسام الداخلي، وهشاشة الأوضاع الأمنية في سيناء أزمات تكبح جماح طموحاتنا وآمالنا التي أفرزتها ثورة يناير العظيمة في استعادة مصر لمكانتها الفريدة بين الأمم، والتي تستحقها لا ريب. وبقدر عظمة الثورة بقدر جسامة التحديات التي تلتها وبقدر الحاجة إلى العناية بترتيب وبناء الداخل قبل (أو بالتوازي مع) الشروع في التمدد للخارج.  

 د. نايل شامة

* نُشرت هذه المقالة بجريدة الشروق (بتاريخ 13 أكتوبر 2012).

 

Morsi's Egypt: Toward a New Foreign Policy?

After consolidating his power domestically by dismissing top military generals, the newly-elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi probably reasoned that it is time he turn his attention to foreign policy. A series of his recent diplomatic activities such as visiting China, attending the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Iran and his visit to the US set for late September raise the question of whether post-revolution Egypt is in the process of rolling out a new active, independent foreign policy.   

There is little doubt that the 2011 revolution broke out primarily because of domestic reasons, such as the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions, rampant corruption and former President Hosni Mubarak's ill-advised plan to groom his unpopular son, Gamal, as his successor. However, foreign policy issues cannot be totally excluded from the factors that drove millions of protestors to demand his ouster. In his last years in office, Mubarak's policies drew closer to the policies of the US/Israeli axis, which came at the expense of an acute drop in legitimacy at home.  

Mubarak harbored a deep-seated sense of distrust towards regional militant Islamic groups, particularly Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), then Egypt's most organized opposition group. He collaborated with Israel in the inhumane blockade of Gaza, exported scarce gas to Israel and turned a blind eye to Israel's maltreatment of the Palestinians.    

A departure from this past is almost inevitable. The new president would most likely reconsider his ties with Israel and search for a new formula of relations with the US.  

With regard to Israel, the honeymoon is undoubtedly over. The peace treaty will be kept, but Egypt may attempt to amend some of its provisions, particularly to allow for the deployment of more Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula (demilitarized by the Camp David Accords) to curb the rising violence of local militants. Despite the MB's heated rhetoric, there will be no return to war, but neither will there be a close alliance.  

A totally new chapter with the US is not in the offing. Even before Morsi's election as president, the MB made overtures to the US administration, assuring her of continued political and economic cooperation, and guaranteeing that the peace treaty with Israel will not be annulled. Egypt is still in need of the US generous military aid, and Washington's political support is crucial to secure badly-needed financial assistance from international financial institutions. Egypt has already requested a $4.8 billion loan from with the International Monetary Fund.   

But Morsi will attempt to diversify his international alliances, and lessen his predecessor's dependence on the Americans. In addition, and in light of Egypt's current economic malaises, its government will seek to bolster its economic relations with the world's major economic powers, including China and the European Union.  

It is within this context that Morsi's visit to China should be viewed. Modern Egyptian-Chinese relations date back to 1956, when late President Gamal Abdel-Nasser recognized the People's Republic of China against the backdrop of Western denunciation. Since then, economic relations have constituted the backbone of the bilateral ties. Egypt is looking forward to attracting Chinese investors and tourists, and various cooperation agreements have been signed during Morsi's visit.  

The future of Egypt's diplomatic relations with Iran represents the real litmus test for change in Egyptian foreign policy. Bilateral relations have been severed for more than thirty years. The Iranians have since Khomeini's death sought a rapprochement with Egypt, but Mubarak was not interested. With him gone, the road seems to be paved for the resumption of relations. Indeed, a few days ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said that both countries are moving toward restoring diplomatic relations.

How soon will that happen remains unclear. Morsi would first have to alleviate the fears of Gulf States leaders, who are concerned an improvement in Egyptian-Iranian relations would tip the regional balance of power toward Iran. Needless to say, the Americans share the same reservations. But mending fences with Tehran would signal Morsi's determination to pursue an independent foreign policy that is neither constrained by Egypt's "special" relationship with the US nor by its need of financial assistance from oil-rich Gulf States.

The foreign policy challenges facing today's Egypt are abundant. Morsi will have to decide where Egypt stands on a number of fast-evolving regional issues, such as the civil war in Syria, the US-Iran discord, and Arab-Israeli relations. Moreover, there is a general feeling in the country that, under Mubarak, Egypt abandoned its responsibilities and forfeited its leading role in the Middle East. Morsi is expected to restore Egypt's strategic and political clout, and he may have just taken the first step toward that goal.    

* This article was published in Global Times (China) on August 30, 2012.

السياسة الخارجية المصرية والعتق من أغلال الشخصنة

في مذكرات وزير الخارجية الأسبق الدكتور مراد غالب قصة جديرة بالتأمل. أحداث القصة تعود إلى عام 1972م عندما قدمت الحكومة الهندية لمصر عرضاً سخياً – من خلال الدكتور غالب – تطلب فيه منها الاعتراف بدولة بنجلاديش التي كانت قد حصلت على استقلالها تواً، في مقابل أن تفتح الهند للجانب المصري مراكز أبحاثها في مجالات الطبيعة النووية، والأبحاث الإلكترونية، والأبحاث الصاروخية والتوجيه. كانت مصر قد حاولت مراراً دخول هذه المجالات الحيوية عن طريق علاقاتها الوثيقة حينئذ بالاتحاد السوفيتي والصين، إلا أن محاولاتها جميعاً باءت بالفشل.

اغتبط غالب بهذا الاقتراح، وذهب ليبشر به الرئيس السادات، باسطاً أمامه آفاق العرض ومزاياه، إلا أن الأخير استهجن الاقتراح قائلاً: "انت عايزني أحط إيدي في إيد جولدا مائير (يقصد أنديرا غاندي)". واستخدام السادات لذلك التشبيه الغريب لم يكن يعني يعني سوى حنقه وغضبه البالغين على أنديرا غاندي، للدرجة التي دفعته إلى تشبيهها برئيسة وزراء إسرائيل، أي أسوأ شخصيات ذلك العصر السياسية بالنسبة لمصر وسائر الدول العربية.

والسبب في هذا الغضب العارم يعود – كما يشرح غالب – إلى أيام الرئيس عبد الناصر، حين زار السادات الهند بوصفه رئيساً لمجلس الأمة، وطلب مقابلة أنديرا غاندي، إلا أن طلبه قوبل بالاعتذار، نتيجة لوجودها خارج العاصمة نيودلهي. استاء السادات بشدة، واعتبرها إهانة شخصية، وأثر هذا فيما بعد على رؤيته لجدوى وأهمية العلاقات المصرية الهندية.

تفتح هذه الواقعة للنقاش مسألة تأثير شخصية القائد السياسي، بكل ما تحمله من صفات وأهواء وتناقضات، على السياسات العليا للدولة. فالرئيس - أي رئيس لأي دولة في العالم - هو في النهاية إنسان، يحب ويكره، ينحاز مع (أو يتحامل على) أطراف وشخصيات وتوجهات وأفكار. وذلك الانحياز أو التحامل لا ينبع بالضرورة من موقف موضوعي ثابت إزاء أيديولوجيات وسياسات محددة، بل قد ينبع من مواقف شخصية تتأثر بالحالة الصحية والمزاجية، أو من تشوهات نفسية خلفتها خبرات سلبية سابقة.

ولا ينحصر ذلك التأثير في النظم السلطوية فقط. إذ يذهب هيكل في كتاب "ملفات السويس" إلى أن أداء رئيس الوزراء البريطاني أنتوني إيدن المزري في أزمة السويس مرده رغبته في الظهور أمام زوجته كلاريسا بمظهر الزعيم الحازم القادر على قيادة الأمة البريطانية، على غرار ما فعل سلفه في رئاسة الوزراء (وعم زوجته) ونستون تشرشل أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية. ومعلوم أيضاً أن معاناة الرئيس الفرنسي الأسبق جورج بومبيدو من سرطان الدم جعله في أيامه الأخيرة أكثر تردداً في قراراته. أدرك الجميع أن بومبيدو كان مريضاً جداً، (حتى أنه أسر لأحد أصدقائه قبل عام من وفاته بأنه "حين يصافح الناس، يتولد لديه الانطباع أنهم يقيسون ضغطه")، وظل بالرغم من ذلك في منصبه، يتخذ قرارات مهمة تؤثر في مصير الدولة الفرنسية تحت ضغط المرض والألم.

أما في مصر ما بين الثورتين (أي ثورتي يوليو ويناير)، فكان الوضع أكثر تفاقماً، إذ سمح الإطار السياسي والقانوني للدولة – بل شجع – على قيام نظام سياسي شديد المركزية، تنطلق معظم قراراته المصيرية من رغبات الرئيس وأمنياته. ودعم تلك المركزية ثقافة سياسية متجذرة تجد في القائد إما المأوى، أو حتى المهرب من مسئولية اتخاذ قرارات مصيرية لها تبعات واسعة. ولنا فيما قاله وزير الخارجية محمود فوزي لعبد الناصر إبان ثورة العراق في عام 1958م دليلاً ساطعاً. فقد فاجأت ثورة عبد الكريم قاسم الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر وهو في جزيرة بريوني اليوغوسلافية، وفي طريق العودة إلى مصر على متن الباخرة "الحرية" طلب عبد الناصر من مرافقيه (وزير الخارجية محمود فوزي والكاتب الصحفي محمد حسنين هيكل) إبداء رأيهما في اقتراح يحتمل وجهتي نظر، فعاد إليه فوزي قائلاً: إن الكفتين متساويتين، وأعتقد أنك وحدك بحكم "إلهام الزعامة" قادر على الترجيح بينهما!!

واقعة السادات مع أنديرا غاندي ليست بالتأكيد الوحيدة التي دفعت فيها المصلحة الوطنية ثمناً باهظاً لأهواء القائد الشخصية. وهي حتماً لن تكون الأخيرة، ما لم يتغير الإطار الدستوري والقانوني للدولة المصرية باتجاه إعلاء شأن ودور المؤسسات، وإجهاض احتمالات سيطرة القائد الفرد علي كل مقاليد الأمور.

والمتابع للحوارات الدائرة هذه الأيام في الفضاء العام يلاحظ أن كثيراً من هذا الحديث يدور حول شئون السياسة الداخلية، مثل محاكمات رموز النظام السابق والوضع الأمني (أو غيابه بالأحرى) وصراعات الديوك بين التيارات السياسية، وقليل منه يتعرض لشئون السياسة الخارجية، وكيفية تقنين أوضاعها، وإصلاح هياكلها في العهد الجديد. وإذا كان هذا طبيعياً لأن "فقه الأولويات" يوجب ترتيب الوضع في الداخل أولاً، فإن مناقشة الدستور الجديد، وقد يكون على الأبواب، تستدعي النظر ملياً إلى المواد المعنية برسم السياسات العامة للدولة، باتجاه مشاركة أكبر لمؤسسات الدولة في عملية صنع القرار السياسي. وضروري أيضاً إعادة النظر في الاختصاصات الأساسية لوزارة الخارجية الواردة في قانون تنظيم وزارة الخارجية، والتي لم يطرأ عليها أي تغيير منذ صدور القانون، رغم تغيير الهيكل الإداري للوزارة أكثر من مرة.

والأهم من ذلك بلا جدال هو التطبيق العملي، الذي يعتمد على وجود إرادة سياسية من قمة الهرم، ورقابة شعبية من قاعدته تنتبه إلى ضرورة إنهاء ارتهان المصالح العليا للبلاد برغبة فرد واحد، والحد إلى أقصى درجة ممكنة من التأثير السلبي للأهواء الشخصية للساسة على عملية صنع القرار السياسي. وبالطبع لن يكون ذلك ممكناً كما أسلفنا إلا في إطار بناء مؤسسات قوية، تعمل في إطار قواعد واضحة، ولها صلاحيات تمنع الرئيس وكبار المسئولين من اختطاف السياسة لصالح مصالحهم وأهوائهم الشخصية.

إذا كانت السلطة مفسدة، والسلطة المطلقة تفتح باباً يفضي للفساد الأعظم، فالأولى أن نسد كل منافذه ونحتاط لكل ذرائعه.

د. نايل شامة

* نُشرت هذه المقالة بجريدة الأهرام (بتاريخ 19 نوفمبر 2011).