Friday, August 20, 2010

1967, 2010: The Annals of Defeat

It was the summer of 1967, immediately following the Six Day War when an Egyptian PhD student was having coffee with a friend, also Egyptian, at a café in Kurfurstendamm, Berlin's main boulevard. The tightly packed café allowed for casual chitchats among strangers, and so the Egyptian friend was caught in a conversation with a German man sitting at a neighboring table. Noticing his heavy German accent, the German asked the Egyptian where he was from, but the Egyptian was evasive, claimed that he "does not have a country," and did his best to change the uncomfortable subject. Perplexed and anxious, the German continued pushing for a convincing answer. After some push and pull, the young Egyptian finally said that "he was from Israel!"

That was the sour effect of the catastrophic defeat. Among the ranks of the grieving, some were not only ashamed to reveal their Egyptian identity, but also felt no remorse for identifying with their chief enemy.

The PhD student who witnessed this conversation is my father. The incident left a lasting scar on his psyche. I heard the story, and more than once. To my father, any talk of the 1967 War was enough to evoke many bitter memories. To all Egyptians, "1967" was not a small loss; hopes were dashed, self-confidence was shaken, the defeat was soaked in humiliation and the future looked bleak.

The Egyptian army had hastily fled the battlefield after a decisive Israeli air strike. War on the Egyptian front lasted less than 6 days. Add to this the deceitful pre-war propaganda that so confidently vowed a swift victory. The Israeli army, Egyptians were told, consisted of nothing but a bunch of unorganized war gangs. Electrified by Nasser's mind-blowing rhetoric, the masses in Egypt believed that war would be a picnic, victory was imminent, and that fellow Palestinians were ready to crown with laurels the triumphant Egyptian army at the gates of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The parades of victory were envisaged before the war even began. On the 9th of June, painful disillusionment reigned.

Fast forward forty-three years to 2010. I was sitting a few weeks ago at a Lebanese café in another German city, Dusseldorf. As soon as the café's Lebanese manager noticed my unambiguous Egyptian accent, he said: "Oh, you come from the country of Mr. President Mubarak," then he fetched a sad sigh and said: "Ya 'eeb el-shom (what a shame)." Bombarded by the unforeseen comment, and because I instantly realized its validity, I paused for a second, before I set myself on a course of improvisation, but the damage had already been done.

The real source of sorrow comes from the fact that this is not an isolated incident. Very recently, the distinguished American political scientist Norman Finkelstein told me that he has noticed lately when he meets Egyptians in the US, that when he asks them about where they are from, "they say: I'm ashamed to say I am from Egypt."

But if 1967 symbolized defeat, anguish and shame, why do Egyptians in 2010 feel defeated so intensely, so deeply? Why is the lack of faith in the future so overwhelming? Why do conversations among Egyptians end with either the phrase "mafeesh fayda" (there is no hope), attributed to the pre-revolution Egyptian politician Saad Zaghloul, or with the "nothing really matters" posture, reflecting pessimism and apathy, respectively?

True, we have not been militarily defeated since 1967. But the ghosts of mental defeat are more haunting than the palpable images of material defeat. Psychologists explain that mental defeat results from the lethal mixture of failing in the present and losing faith in future recovery. "If you have no confidence in self, you are twice defeated in the race of life," journalist and activist Marcus Garvey rightly opines.

Despite their significance, economic malaise cannot alone explain this irresistible sense of defeat. Even privileged Egyptians harbor the same "defeat mentality." It is certainly possible to speak of the "civilizational defeat," the gap with the first world that widens every day, our faltering education system that produces many graduates but few brains, and our backwardness in science and technology.

In my opinion, however, more importantly behind this sense of defeat is the lack of freedom, the routine curtailment of civil liberties, the breach of human rights every morning and every night, the sub-human treatment of detainees in police stations and state prisons. In such an outrageous milieu, unsurprisingly, one political detainee described his detention center as "the capital city of hell." And, CIA agent Robert Baer remarked, "if you wanted to make someone disappear – never to return – you send him to Egypt."

The case of Khaled Said, the 28-year old Alexandrian man who was brutally beaten to death by two policemen, was a reminder that we Egyptians – anyone of us with no connections, no immunity - are not protected against such atrocities. One need only be in the wrong place at the wrong time to be humiliated, tortured and perhaps even killed. And if one is killed, like Khaled Said, the authoritarian state and its formidable security and media wings will spare no effort to assassinate his character. That is double homicide, a la today's Egypt, under today's regime.

The Lebanese man was right. What a shame.

That is a worse defeat than 1967. In this sense, tragically, the tanks of the Israelis were more merciful than the clubs and sticks of Egypt's riot police. The Israelis, after all, were the blunt and visible enemies in 1967, but the security soldiers are our fellow countrymen, they are both victims and aggressors.

I feel defeated, but I am not ashamed to say I am Egyptian. My country has a great civilization, lovely people, a rich culture, a massive reservoir of soft power, and a huge future potential. I thus have no doubt that one day the proud nation of Egypt will acquire the democracy it deserves.

I am not ashamed, but I am anxiously looking forward to the day when no fellow citizen is harassed because a police officer "doesn’t like the look on his face," when peaceful demonstrators are not beaten or sexually assaulted, when the state of emergency - uninterruptedly applied since 1981 – is finally annulled, and when perpetrators of torture do not slip away from punishment.

The eminent Egyptian novelist Alaa Al-Aswany seals each of his articles with the phrase: "democracy is the solution." How right he is.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on August 19, 2010.

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Norman Finkelstein (Interviewed by Nael Shama)


Einstein once said: "Unthinking respect for authority is the greatest enemy of truth." Among the few scholars who dared to question the authority of the biased US intellectual community's vision of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict is political scientist and writer Norman Finkelstein.


Norman Finkelstein was born in 1953 to Jewish parents who survived the holocaust. His mother's memories of the atrocities she had witnessed, and her routine outrage at the perpetrators of any crime against humanity, instilled in him genuine sympathy with all human sufferings - irrespective of race, color and faith - and a deep longing for justice.


Finkelstein finished his undergraduate studies at Binghamton University, and earned his Master's and PhD degrees from Princeton University. Soon after, he became a vocal critic of Israel's brutal policies, and a staunch supporter of the rights of Palestinians.


He authored a number of books on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Holocaust, such as Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History and, most recently, This Time We Went Too Far: Truth and Consequences of the Gaza Invasion. His books have been translated into more than 40 foreign editions.


The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering, first published in 2000, is Finkelstein's most provoking and controversial book. Using thorough investigation, an outstanding ability to dissect the subject and connect the scattered dots, plus his brilliant sarcasm, he disdainfully denounced the holocaust industry for using the memory of a brutal genocide to serve present-day ideological and material purposes. When it came out, the book was described by The Guardian as "the most explosive book of the year." The book opened the gates of hell for Finkelstein who was ostracized by Israel and many Jewish organizations in the US.


Finkelstein initiated another heated debate in 2003 when he described the then recently published book (The Case for Israel), authored by the pro-Israel scholar and Professor of Law at Harvard University, Alan Dershowitz, as "a collection of fraud, falsification, plagiarism, and nonsense." Dershowitz denied the accusations and threatened libel action over the charges of Finkelstein. Another controversy ensued concerning the definition of plagiarism and proper methods of citation in academic studies.


Finkelstein's daring, sharp and controversial views, which in most cases contradict with the mainstream views of the American intellectual community, did not come without a price. In June 2007, he was denied tenure at De Paul University, allegedly because his "personal and reputation demeaning attacks" on a number of scholars – including Dershowitz - were inconsistent with De Paul's "Vincentian" values. The incident did cast serious doubt across the United States on the integrity of academic institutions, and their immunity to political pressure.

Finkelstein: Israel May Target Nasrallah's Deputy

Q: Let me first delve into the repercussions of the Gaza aid flotilla confrontation. Many aid ships are expected to head for Gaza in the coming months. What kind of change could this "aid offensive" lead to in light of Israel's determination to block their entrance into Gaza?
I think things are becoming now a little bit confusing, and there needs to be clarity on exactly what goals people are trying to accomplish. And there needs to be, I think, a common plan. There are many individual initiatives being set up, and it is unclear whether the goal is to break the siege of Gaza, or different organizations and different states using the Gaza siege for their own separate agendas. And I don’t think that’s helpful.
The goal obviously has to be to fully end the siege of Gaza, to allow for – as several human rights organizations have said – Gazans to live a normal and dignified life, to allow them to enter and leave Gaza as they want, the ability to have exports to restore the economy, and just to have a normal life to the extent it is possible. That’s the goal. But I'm not confident that goal can be reached in the form of so many different initiatives, so many different flotillas, and the fact that it is becoming unclear whether it is the interests of the people of Gaza that are served, or whether it is different states and different organizations using Gaza for their own agendas.

Q: When you say "states with different agendas," are you referring to the Turkish role?
I think the Turkish initiative was very authentic, but one of the problems with success is that everybody wants to imitate it. And they want to imitate it not necessarily for the same original motives.

Q: You said that Israel is "acting like a lunatic state," certainly in light of Israel's blunders in Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008/9), the assassination of Al-Mabhouh in Dubai (2010) and most recently the attack on the aid flotilla. How can the international community best deal with such a lunatic state?
I think the main challenge is to simply enforce the law. And there are many aspects of the law which have gone unenforced. First, Amnesty International has said that there should be a comprehensive arms embargo imposed on Israel and Hamas, because they said Israel is a consistent violator of human rights, and under international law and domestic American law, it is illegal to transfer weapons to a country which is a consistent violator of human rights. So that’s one law which should be enforced.
Secondly, there is the issue that remains pending, namely the resolution of the United Nations for an independent investigation of the crimes that were committed in Gaza {during the 2008/9 Israeli offense}. That law too should be enforced.
And, more generally, it is now been 43 years since Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank, and in my opinion, it is no longer a legal occupation under international law. It is no longer what is technically called a "belligerent occupation." It has become an illegal occupation, because the fundamental characteristic of a belligerent occupation is that it is supposed to be transitional until the end of war hostilities.
Israel has no intention of ending this occupation. Israel is intending to annex crucial parts of the West bank, and effectively control the whole of it, so it is no longer a belligerent occupation. It is an illegal occupation. And so the law should be enforced there, and Israel should be forced to leave the occupied territories.
And then there is one other outstanding issue, and that’s the issue of the nuclear weapons, and there, I think again, we should follow what the international community has said. Since 1995, the IAEA has called for the Middle East to be turned into a "weapons of mass destruction free zone," and I think that should be enforced as well.

Q: So Israel is lunatic and aggressive but it is also slowly becoming a pariah state. Could this dangerous mixture drive Israel to take another wrong move? Perhaps a strike against Iran?
I don’t think the Israelis will launch a strike against Iran, but they will do something to restore what they call their "deterrence capacity." With each bungled operation, Israel becomes more and more worried that the Arab world will not fear it. And as one Israeli General commented a few weeks ago, "it is ok if the Arabs think we are crazy, but it is not ok if they think we are crazy and incompetent." And so Israel is concerned that their succession of bungled operations is conveying the impression that it is no longer a formidable fighting force. And so it will do something in order to restore its deterrence capacity. Exactly what is that I could not say, but I suspect they may do something like trying to assassinate the second person in Hezbollah, someone like Naim Kassem {Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah}. They wouldn’t touch Nasrallah because they recognize that would unleash a chain reaction, which could have devastating consequences for them, but they would consider assassinating Kassem, or some operation like that.

Finkelstein: The Role of Egypt Has Become So Shameful.

Q: The Rafah Crossing issue has become quite controversial in Egypt lately. On one hand, the Egyptian government claims that Israel should shoulder its responsibilities towards the Gaza Strip, as long as the Strip remains occupied. But on the other hand, keeping the only gate to Gaza that is not under Israeli control closed raises questions about Egypt's participation in the inhumane siege. What are your views on this issue?
I think both statements are correct. Under International law, Israel is the occupying power, and it has the responsibility for restoring normal order and peace in Gaza. On the other hand, it is true that Egypt is a collaborationist regime. The role of Egypt in support of Israel's brutal occupation of Gaza has become so shameful, so appalling. It is simply a disgrace.
I have noticed lately when I meet Egyptians, as I often do in the United States, that when I ask them where they are from, they say: I'm ashamed to say I am from Egypt. This 30-year dictatorship is really quite terrible, and it's quite shameful that it required an action by Turkey to force Egypt to open up the Rafah border, because Egypt understood the message that was being transmitted, namely a non-Arab Muslim state cared more about the Palestinians than an Arab state.

Q: Does this mean that Egypt has recently moved closer to the Israeli position?
Egypt did not move closer to the Israeli position, because there is no space between the Egyptian and the Israeli positions to begin with. There is no way it can move closer. There has been only one disagreement between Egypt and Israel, and that’s over the weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. Otherwise, Egypt is just a client state of the United States, and collaborators with Israel.

Q: Doesn’t this delegitimize what Egypt claims to be the "honest broker" role it has been playing between the Israelis and the Palestinians?
Egypt is a client state of the United States. It does not have any independent role whatsoever. And Mubarak is probably the most revolting creature in the Arab world today. I think there is a consensus among everybody here. He is actually kind of a freak.

Q: The US President Barack Obama is increasingly seen in the Arab world as a "man of words, not actions." Since his speech at Cairo University last year, nothing has been achieved on the peace process track. Are you anticipating any change in US foreign policy towards the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in the coming months?
There is no change that’s going to come from President Obama. That’s quite clear, and anybody who invested hope in it – and I was not one of them – should now be free of any illusions. There are two developments which are true: First, there has been a significant shift in American public opinion, both among Americans generally and among American Jews, regarding Israel. And I think it is correct to say that a rift has opened up between large segments of Americans – including American Jews – and Israel.
Secondly, Israel's erratic actions have caused members of ruling elites in the United States to consider whether or not Israel is the strategic asset it once was for the US. And you see a certain amount of questioning that has been occurring among ruling elites about the usefulness of the alliance with Israel. And of course that is going to reflect itself in some gestures by Obama, but those are strictly reactive, that is, he is reacting to developments on the ground, but there are no initiatives coming from him.

Q: And when, in your opinion, could these developments in US society and public opinion be translated into real change in US foreign policy?
It is going to take a long time. It is important for that shift in public opinion to occur, but nothing will come of that shift unless it is harnessed into a political force. And that kind of organizing hasn’t yet begun. There needs to be created a serious lobby, which will take that public opinion and turn it into a political actor in the American political system. And that has not happened yet. If public opinion changes, but people don’t act on that change in opinion, it makes no difference whether it has changed or not. All you have to do is get people to take the next step, and to act on it.


* This interview was published in Daily News (Egypt) on July 28&29, 2010.

Thursday, July 15, 2010

Mr. El-Baradei: Are you Losing the Momentum?


The return of Mohamed El-Baradei to Egypt and his readiness to challenge President Hosni Mubarak in the upcoming presidential elections was like throwing a pebble in the stagnant waters of Egyptian politics. It stirred political debate, mobilized many hitherto apolitical and raised hopes for the possibility of change towards democracy and the rule of law in the country that has been weighed down by authoritarianism and corruption for almost six decades.

Recently, however, there has been a growing feeling that the initial fervor that accompanied the beginning of El-Baradei's adventure has been dwindling. El-Baradei and his close associates have probably overlooked, or misinterpreted, a number of points.

First, the disparity of power between the Egyptian regime and its opponents is vast. After long decades in power, the Egyptian regime has become well-entrenched in Egyptian society. By controlling the security apparatus, the media, and dozens of government agencies that operate in all fields of public life, the Egyptian regime has risen to a colossal, octopus-like entity, thus perceived by many as metaphysical and unassailable. Moreover, in Egypt's centralized political system, the president enjoys draconian powers, by virtue of the constitution and a deep-rooted cultural heritage.

Opposing, the state - this gigantic, unmerciful establishment that has many carrots and sticks at its disposal - is not less challenging than swimming against an invincible current. Even the unprecedented pressure exerted by the United States – the world's only superpower and the provider of massive economic and military assistance to the Egyptian regime – bore little fruit. To deflect George W. Bush's feverish push for political reform in the years 2004 and 2005, Mubarak only introduced cosmetic changes to appease his paymasters, but he ultimately kept his strong grip on power.

In battles with stronger foes, El-Baradei must remember, weaker parties should make use of all weapons at hand.

Secondly, youth comprises the vast majority of Mohamed El-Baradei's constituency. He directly addresses them and insists on the leading role they can play in the battle for change. But in contrast to his quiet, gradual, and calculated style, the young demand a bolder and more aggressive approach. There are signs that many of his staunch supporters are beginning to find him uninspiring, hence unworthy of leadership.

Momentum is one of the weapons needed to maintain unity of any movement. Political leaders cannot be divorced from their followers. After all, what is a leader really worth without followers? And what is left of a movement that vows change if it loses its momentum? This is not an invitation for El-Baradei to substitute wisdom and reason with the impulsiveness and spontaneity of youth, but incorporating rather than alienating one's base of support is undoubtedly a must.

Counting on the unquestionable support of masses of young Egyptians would not be possible unless these peoples' concerns, thoughts, aspirations and emotions are listened to, and acted on.

Thirdly, drama is crucial to success in the game of politics. Drama is not equal to theatrical performances that capitalize on hollow rhetoric or pure demagogy. It is rather the personal embodiment of a leader's moral and political blueprint, using a creative mishmash of gesture politics, elements of surprise, and a sensible dose of excitement, in order to raise awareness and foster acquiescence.

As the modern history of the Arab world vividly demonstrates, too much personalization is catastrophic, but too little of it is suicidal. Lackluster leaders are quickly forgotten, however qualified and devoted. Even in democratic societies, the impact of leadership is enormous.

In the Arab world, moreover, the dynamics that govern the relationship between leaders and people are peculiar. The masses of unsophisticated people do not really grasp the deeper meanings of notions such as "democracy," "secularism," and "pluralism." They would yearn for freedom and dignity, and wish for an improvement in their living conditions. But they would not decode the intricacies of politics, or understand its underlying philosophical foundations. Without passion, leaders' chances of success are minimal.

That’s why King Hassan II of Morocco explained: “I am obliged to personify power as strongly as possible, for people do not obey a program or a plan. They obey men, a team of men, and it is all for the best if that team is embodied in a chief and symbolized by one face, one voice, one personality."

Perhaps out of inattentiveness to these vital realities, El-Baradei frequently stresses that Egypt "does not need a savior." This posture evokes a serious dilemma: unless El-Baradei's followers see him as a savior and a leader, they will quit following him. If the link between leader and people is cut, then the very act of leadership is likewise cut from its roots. El-Baradei would be shooting himself in the foot.

El-Baradei needs to incorporate the politics of spectacle into his program of action.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on July 15, 2010.

Friday, July 2, 2010

Thank God South Africa is Hosting the World Cup!

Press coverage of South Africa has been boosted to an all-time high, thanks to the country's hosting of the 19th FIFA World Cup. Documentaries and media reports broadcast round the clock on the world's major TV network do not only refer to the intense soccer competitions that will conquer the hearts and minds of football fans for one whole month, but also to the booming South African economy, its long struggle against Apartheid as well as various aspects of the country's cultural and social life.

Many Egyptians envy South Africa for this unprecedented world attention. Publicity is so important in today's globalized world. It is good for business, tourism and prestige. But, as marketing experts contend, publicity should only be sought when there are positive things to be publicized. Bad products cannot make use of advertisement, however efficient and incessant.

Those with sharper-than-fish memories remember well that six years ago Egypt bid to host the current football World Cup. To Egypt, the race was not so tight. In contrast to South Africa and Morocco, who secured 14 and 10 votes respectively, Egypt got a big goose egg. The public relations disaster, dubbed as the "Mondiale Zero" and seen as a symbol of Egypt's overall civilizational failure, still resonates in public discourses until today.

In contrast to Egypt, so much has been achieved in South Africa - politically, economically and socially - since the end of apartheid and the commencement of majority rule in 1994. Economically, the sustainability of strong growth rates, the significant increase in GDP per capita (from $2,440 in 2002 to $5,411 in 2006), as well as the remarkable drop in inflation rates (from 9% in 2002 to 4.6% in 2006), all reflect the rise of a robust and promising economy. The values of democracy and the rule of law have become deep-rooted, and a reverse of this process - fueled by the blood, sweat and tears of South Africans - seems unlikely.

Corruption, crime and AIDS are the major scourges currently haunting South Africans, and, so far, the government record on these three issues remains mixed, but positive outcomes are expected to ensue in the coming decade.

South Africa is also righteously proud of its historic leader Nelson Mandela. The anti-apartheid activist, who cheerfully spent 27 years in prison to free his people, turned into the greatest symbol of freedom and independence in the African continent.

There is sadly no grand figure like Mandela in Egypt's current history that can provide inspiration and elicit reverence. Egyptian politics renders nothing but the dismal image of an octogenarian leader who, after three decades at the helm, still clings to power and grooms his whiz kid to succeed him, and a bunch of worthless opposition parties that are content with the leftovers of the regime's poisoned banquet. This image evokes either sympathy or contempt.

There is certainly no scarcity of media stories about Egypt. But all pictures - and a picture is worth a thousand words – are detrimental and deeply upsetting. Take, for example, the grotesque picture of a young man's disfigured face that reveals human brutality and repression in their worst modes. Another surrealistic picture would be of the crowds of indignant protestors, who sought refuge on the People Assembly's threshold, overlooking the fact that the ruling party's parliamentarians are among the actors that have initially put them in these miserable conditions. What drives the prey so eagerly back to its hunter?

Equally embarrassing are the inhumane decaying conditions in slum areas, which have dropped from the moral calculus of the government, but will not drop from the interest of international news networks. All these images are very embarrassing, indeed.

Another clip of contemporary Egypt will have to shed light on ordinary people, the millions of weary Egyptians who struggle for the basic needs of life against the backdrop of harsh social and economic conditions. One day in the life of any of these people – at home, work and public transportation – speaks volumes about the country and what little has remained of its glorious past.

On another crucial level, the hospitality of Egyptians is, regrettably, in many ways becoming a relic of the past. In reality, the picture is not as rosy as the advertisements of the Ministry of Tourism try to portray. Walking in the streets of Cairo is mostly not feasible because pavements are hijacked by cafes, street vendors or parked cars. Renting a car is not a safe journey either; driving in major Egyptian cities needs skill, patience and, ironically, inattention to the basics of driving rules, and street signs are either non-existent or misleading. In addition, public transportation is in shambles and riding a taxi exposes one to the gluttony and immorality of taxi drivers. Plus, warnings against sexual harassment are today on any traveler's guide to Egypt. Due to skyrocketing pollution rates (exacerbated lately by the smog cloud), moreover, visitors to Cairo would inhale an overdose of smoke and dust, which would make them think twice before coming back to "drink again from the water of the Nile."

So, unlike South Africa, there is hardly anything so bright to brag about. Had Egypt hosted the World Cup, Egypt's apt organizers would have likely resorted to the conventional use, or abuse, of the Pharaonic legacy, indirectly admitting that to find positive aspects worth propagating, one needs to look thousands of years back for help.

Most Egyptians have already been disillusioned with the sham feelings of superiority they had been injected with since childhood. This is why they realize that there is still a lot to be done to make their country a better place. Therefore, the unrelenting buzzing of the awful vuvuzelas notwithstanding, they are grateful for South Africa's successful and impressive hosting of the World Cup.

Nael M. Shama


* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on Thursday July 1, 2010 (Page 7).

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

In the Footsteps of Fascists: The Mubaraks and Egyptian Football


Football and politics are not two mutually exclusive realms as many may think. To gain legitimacy, bolster their rule and spread their ideology, various political leaders have turned football into a political and ideological battlefield. In the heyday of Fascism, for example, Mussolini, Hitler and Franco used football to achieve multiple political ends.

Though the Italian leader Benito Mussolini was not a fan of football, the rising popularity of the game in the 1920s impelled him to pay attention to its dynamics and impact. "Opportunity," argues Professor of International Sports History Pierre Lanfranchi, is the key word that explains "why this wedding between fascism and football worked well," a wedding that ushered in the age of "football in a black skirt."

Italian fascists were attuned to the influence of popular culture. They realized that through football, they can effectively reach and influence the masses. According to Simon Martin, historian and author of Football and Fascism: The National Game under Mussolini, fascists "were very keen to attach themselves to the sport all over the country." Football was exploited domestically to create consensus by developing a sense of national Italian identity and cement Il Duce's popularity, and internationally to promote Italy's image in the world.

Adolf Hitler also used the magnificent appeal of football to serve the parochial interests of his Nazi regime. As host of the World Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936, the master of propaganda in the 1930s scored a huge propaganda success, just as Mussolini had done with Italy's organization of the 1934 World Football Cup.

After WW II, Spain's notorious Francisco Franco became aware of the appealing charm of football. In the age of television, he made sure football games are broadcast on TV, to keep people off the streets when social turmoil was anticipated. Franco adopted the Spanish Capital's major club – Real Madrid – considering it the symbolic embodiment of his fascist regime. The current rivalry between the teams of Real Madrid and Barcelona dates back to Franco's adoption of the former and his suppression of the latter.

Mubarak rejuvenated these long-forgotten fascist traditions. In a country like Egypt, where successes are rare, and corruption, despotism and inefficiency are commonplace, getting associated with football seemed to be the only way for Mubarak's authoritarian regime to fill its acute legitimacy deficit. In Egypt, football is the opium of the masses. Egyptians jokingly say that the biggest two political parties in the country are Al-Ahly and Zamalek—Egypt's top football clubs. With millions of enthusiastic supporters, the fans of these two clubs far outnumber members of all political parties who suffer from state oppression, which has ensured the dominance of the ruling national Democratic Party (NDP) over the past thirty years.

No wonder thus, after his rise to power in 1981, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sought to give his people the impression of a healthy leader, who wakes up early, plays tennis, and is genuinely interested in sports. The official media has depicted him ever since as "the guardian of sports and sportsmen," and Mubarak spared no chance to confirm this image.

Last November, the fierce competition between Egypt and its archrival, Algeria, resulted in a vicious propaganda campaign between the two countries. In the heat of the crisis, Mubarak called the Egyptian Ambassador from Algiers. In foreign relations, Mubarak has been a lifetime pragmatist, who favors diplomacy and reconciliation, and shies away from conflict and confrontation. But appeasing the disgruntled football fans was an opportunity not to be missed.

Furthermore, the Egyptian state' interference in football has left its prints on Egyptian football. In the recent few years, formidable state institutions have poured massive funds into their own clubs, resulting in a fundamental shift in the structure of the Egyptian Football League. In the season 2009/2010, seven teams in the first division of the league (which comprises 16 teams) were funded and run by the ministries of Interior, Defense, Military Production and Petroleum. Consequently, the popular teams, that have historically shaped Egyptian football for the past century or so, have suffered from negligence and scarcity of resources, and many dropped to the second division. Major Egyptian cities, such as Tanta, Mansoura, Aswan, Al-Minya, and Damietta are not represented anymore in the first division.

Football also figures heavily in the current heated question of succession to the nearly three-decade rule of the octogenarian Hosni Mubarak. Like father, like son. The recent national football team's winning of the African Cup of Nations – the third in a row – was a golden photo opportunity that Gamal Mubarak, Hosni's Mubarak's son and heir apparent, could not miss. Gamal attended the final match in Angola and headed back home with the team, to salute the masses that flocked to Cairo Airport to receive the heroes.

Egypt's gigantic official propaganda machine claimed that the moral support Gamal Mubarak had given to the national football team was crucial to its bright success. The media's feverish attempts to attach the achievements of the team to the genius of Gamal Mubarak prompted an independent Egyptian journalist to ask: "Is it Egypt's national team, or the team of Gamal Mubarak?"

True, football was used by authoritarian regimes, but it could also be the antidote against the evils of authoritarianism. Many Egyptian activists contemplate using stadiums to express their support of former International Atomic Agency Chief, Mohamed El-Baradei, who, since declaring his readiness to run in the 2011 presidential elections, came to symbolize Egyptians' hope in a democratic and free Egypt.



Nael M. Shama

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

The High Dam and the Underground Barrier

The Egyptian regime is a master at exposing its own weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It commemorated the 50th anniversary of the construction launch of the High Dam in Aswan by erecting an underground metal wall along Egypt's border with Gaza. By doing that, it gave commentators a golden chance to ponder the drastic changes that have engulfed Egyptian politics in 50 years.

The story of the High Dam cannot be told without mentioning the Suez Canal Company. In 1956, when the United States withdrew its offer to assist in funding the dam in a statement that combined arrogance with ignorance, Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, a longtime source of foreign domination and humiliation. By using the revenues of the canal to finance the dam, he killed two birds with one stone. The idea of building the High Dam originated from a political platform that stresses objectives like the acceleration of economic and social development, the assertion of national will and emancipation from foreign control.

On the other hand, the barrier is part and parcel of other sad realities, such as Egypt's sick addiction to its dependence on the US, its shameful collaboration with Israel against fellow Arabs in Gaza and its inhumane foreign policy.

The fact that the Americans declined to fund the building of the dam in the 1950s, but provided technical expertise (and perhaps funding) to the barrier 50 years later are two manifestations of one unchanging US policy: rewarding clients and punishing states who don’t follow US dictates.

Egypt's struggle to build the dam, control the canal and defy the tripartite invasion in 1956 elevated its stature in the Third World. Egypt was rightly seen by demonstrators in Jakarta, Beirut and Caracas, among others, as one of the "leaders of the free world" who refused to bow to great powers and surrender their rights to freedom and advancement after decades of painful subjugation to foreign powers.

History came full circle. The decades of independence that came after 1956 were followed with decades of rotation within the orbit of US interests, which shattered Egypt's soft power in the Third World. Because of the decision to build the metal barrier, today's demonstrators in Jakarta, Beirut and Caracas, among others, burn Egyptian flags to condemn the Egyptian regime's ill-fated and unjust policies. Cairo is seen as suppressing the struggle of Palestinian freedom fighters and destroying their livelihoods.

Taming the River Nile was no easy job. The volume of construction material used to build the dam could be used to build 17 Great Pyramids. The mega project, considered one of the greatest engineering accomplishments of modern times, required the collaboration of thousands of engineers, technicians and workers over a period of ten years. It was a rare instance of unity between the ruler and the ruled—a "national project" that, luckily, did not merely revolve around the winning of a football game.

On the other hand, the barrier on the border with Gaza is but one part in a long cycle of discord between the current Egyptian regime and its people. The bond between ruler and ruled has been long broken, and the regime's frantic references to "Egypt's national security" and "the need to protect internal stability" are no longer convincing.

One of the gifts of the High Dam was the generation of electrical power. Thousands of Egyptian villages were, for the first time, blessed with electricity, which boosted both agriculture and industry. The dam also enabled Egypt to regulate its share of Nile water. The water stored in Lake Nasser rescued Egypt at times of drought. As such, the High dam was a source of life to Egypt's impoverished and underdeveloped countryside.

In contrast, the barrier along the Gaza border is an evil force of destruction, killing the only remaining lifeline to Gaza's besieged population. To beat a suffocating Israeli blockade, hundreds of tunnels were built to smuggle foodstuff, medicine, fuel, construction material and other basic necessities from Egyptian territory to the Gaza Strip. According to economic experts, smuggling constitutes around 90 percent of Gaza's economic activity. Without these tunnels, and with the Israeli siege and the infrequent opening of the Rafah Crossing, Gaza will starve.

In the 1950s, the Egyptian regime was very vocal about its need to build the dam. The High Dam embodied the aspirations of "the new Egypt" to progress and development. "As we build the High Dam, we build a dam of freedom and dignity," Nasser proudly said.

On the contrary, the construction of the underground barrier was shrouded with secrecy and ambiguity. To avoid embarrassment, the Egyptian regime was keen on finishing the unpleasant job in total secrecy. In fact, until this moment, the Egyptian government did not clearly specify the type of "construction work" it is undertaking along the border with Gaza. This contrast should not come as a surprise. Great achievements are announced, propagated and celebrated. Shameful deeds are disguised and buried.

The High Dam will remain an icon of development and a symbol of the fight of Egyptians with blood, toil, tears and sweat against exploitation. While the huge structure in Aswan will defy time and continue to remind Egyptians of the single project that saved their great nation from the dangers of flood and drought, the worthless barrier will sooner or later sink into oblivion, forgotten by people and apologized for by authorities.


Nael M. Shama


* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on February 4, 2010.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

The Retreat from Civilization in Egypt


I often wonder why any Egyptian would condone the sickening torture inflicted on suspects in police stations. Such condoning usually takes place when these suspects are charged with disgraceful crimes, such as child molestation or rape. How do these people, I often ask myself, so readily overlook the fact that a suspect remains innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, after a fair trial? And how can they possibly forget that the job of police officers is to ensure that the rights of suspects are guaranteed, and not to take it on themselves to "serve justice" so brutally?

It turned out many in Egypt revere force, and the show of crude force, much more than they respect the constitution, the law, and moral principles.

In the history of mankind, the phase of civilization refers to the emergence of a social order that allowed people to resolve their disputes and differences peacefully. In primitive societies, confined to wilderness and detached from arable land, violence was common, usually in savage ways. This brutality came under control with the advent of civilizations. The rise of institutions with clearly-stated laws, rules and procedures, and the development of moral and ethical points of reference rendered violence both prohibited and punishable.

Clearly, the adoration of force is reminiscent of the age of barbarism, defined by conflict and force. As such, it alludes to the process of "retreat from civilization."

The anarchy that dominates the Egyptian street is a vivid example of this retreat-from-civilization trend. Though traffic rules do exist, they are not even remotely applied, making Cairo's tightly-packed streets the arena of "a war of all against all." In the absence of the state and its representatives, the rule of the jungle prevails once again; survival is certainly for "the fittest," that is, the more aggressive and violent.

The same trend is reflected in the spread of the "baltaga" (thuggery) phenomenon in the last few years. Knowing that the state and its institutions are in many cases unable, or perhaps unwilling, to provide justice and maintain order, some people decide to rely on crude force to regain their rights, or settle scores with adversaries. With time and practice, this approach has become to many the first option to be considered, not the last resort.

Another basic feature of civilized men and women is the ability of self-restraint, which was conspicuously lacking during the Egypt-Algeria faceoff that followed the key match between the two countries' national teams in the 2010 World Cup qualifiers. The response of Egyptian media to the attacks on Egyptian fans in Sudan (and Egyptian interests in Algeria) was excessively emotional, amateurish, and hasty. Instead of rationally defining the problem and understanding its underlying causes, anger and frustration led many commentators to slide into diabolizing the "other," indulging in acts of chauvinistic self-praise and even inciting violence.

On the popular "Al-Qahira Al-Youm" night show, one anchor—Ahmed Moussa—retorted to the first news of the attack on Egyptians in Sudan by unleashing the barbarous mindset ordinarily hidden beneath the big smile and the fancy business suit. "Our people are being attacked and killed in Sudan. There are Algerians living here in Egypt, we can attack them too," he said. Fortunately, his co-presenter, Amr Adib, could still be reasonable amidst this unrestrained folly. He quickly interrupted Moussa and asked him to focus on how to resolve the crisis, instead of initiating a new unnecessary—and unethical, one can add— one.

The ascendancy of a barbaric culture—one that values force and disregards laws and moral values—in Egyptian society is indeed alarming. Symptoms of this mentality are apparent in the elections of professional syndicates and sports clubs. How, otherwise, could one interpret the winning of candidates who are widely known for having no credentials—no knowledge, outstanding managerial skills or expertise—but the ability to act like thugs, through using (or threatening to use) force, and intimidating rivals? Those who voted for these candidates were driven by the same mentality that, in the heat of the recent Egyptian-Algerian crisis, made many Egyptians ready to beat up any Algerian they can find in retaliation for what happened to our football fans.

During the recent Egyptian-Algerian media war, many in Egypt bragged about how "civilized we are" compared to other nations. Their point is valid. Egypt's chapter in the book of world civilizations is perhaps the longest. But a new culture has been slowly creeping beneath the fabric of Egyptian society, a culture that admires power to the point of fascination, encourages aggressive attitudes and disrespects laws, regulations and ethics.

Our ancestors must be spinning in their graves.



Nael M. Shama


* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on December 24, 2009.

Sunday, December 20, 2009

Do Algerians Hate Us?

The football-mania that preceded and followed the Egypt-Algeria match in Sudan for the 2010 World Cup qualifiers started with hostile internet and media campaigns, and developed into rioting and stone-throwing of players and fans, then morphed into a social and political battle that included harsh diplomatic statements and demands for cutting diplomatic ties.

Egyptians have been particularly alarmed at the amount of hatred and contempt of Egypt that could be felt from the words of the Algerian press (and Algerian fans online) and the huge amount of stones and knives thrown on thousands of Egyptians fans in Khartoum.

The mass media in Egypt dealt with this unpleasant incident in two ways. The first was to ignore the problem altogether, emphasizing instead on the many political and cultural bonds that connect the two nations together. Hate speech that could be abundantly found online was dismissed by referring to the fact that its perpetrators are merely irresponsible teenagers. This approach failed to answer a crucial question: why do Algerian teenagers harbor such ill-feelings towards Egypt in the first place?

The second approach did the exact opposite. In an act of chauvinism, it spilled oil on fire by generalizing the misconduct of the opposite party. So a bunch of Algerian youth burning the Egyptian flag or shouting anti-Egyptian slogans meant for sure that all Algerians "hate and envy Egypt." In the meantime, Egyptian misconduct towards the Algerian team was totally ignored.

Neither of the two approaches is constructive; the first evades important questions through denial, the second offers prejudiced and chauvinistic answers. The question remains: Do Algerians indeed hate Egypt? If so, why?

Because Arabs share many things, such as a common language, culture, and history, they are seen by many as forming one nation, something that prompted some politicians and political parties to build castles in the air about a constitutional unity among all Arab states from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. This dream did not materialize because of myriad regional and international hurdles, but the idea of cultural unity and social harmony among Arabs was entertained, and strong proof of its existence was certainly evident.

The recent history of Egypt and Algeria in particular witnessed periods of mutual cooperation during some of the two countries' brightest moments of glory. For example, Nasser's Egypt provided substantial support to the Algerian rebels in their fight against French occupation, and a few years later, the Algerian leadership provided generous military assistance to Egypt during the 1973 war against Israel. However, in the quest for understanding the mounting tension between both peoples, these examples do not count much, simply because official policy does not necessarily reflect public temperament.

The social, cultural and economic differences between the populations of the nations that make up the Arab League are huge. In fact, the Arab world is, as one analyst explained, an "anthropologist's paradise." What is common, for example, between a Lebanese Maronite, a Southern Sudanese from the Dinka tribe and a wealthy Kuwaiti businessman?

It is naïve to believe that the tension that predated and followed the key game between Egypt and Algeria was generated by football alone. The intense competition was just an opportunity that revealed, or revived, the animosity and ill-feelings that are customarily hidden behind the sweet "Arab brotherhood" talk. The curse of football is usually blamed for the untamed transgression of its fans, but the recent volatile situation was a blessing in the sense that it was an eye-opener to Egyptians, revealing the diluteness of Arab feelings and highlighting the ill-feelings of some Arab people towards Egyptians.

It is perplexing to understand why many Algerians see Egypt merely as a puppet of the state of Israel. And why do our brothers in Islam and Arabhood today so joyfully rag Egyptians about their humiliating defeat against Israel that occurred some forty years ago? And how can one reconcile the warm feelings of brotherhood with the cold, bloody assault on Egyptian fans in Sudan?

Answers point to the cultural differences between the two populations, the impact disapproval of Egyptian foreign policies, particularly towards Israel and the Palestinian problem, may have had on the way Egypt and Egyptians are perceived in the Arab world, and the alleged "haughtiness" of Egyptians vis-à-vis fellow Arabs.

In all cases, the frequent mistreatment of Egyptian citizens in oil-rich Gulf States, and the frictions that usually erupt during inter-Arab sports competitions led many Egyptians to believe that the notion of "Arab nationalism" is nothing but a big mirage; it only exists in the rosy fantasies of idealistic leaders.


Nael M. Shama


* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on December 3, 2009.

Thursday, October 29, 2009

Niqab and the Boundaries of Debate


The worst thing about the current debate over niqab (face veil) is that it gives the impression of a "healthy" and "free" society that openly discusses all contending views of its most pressing problems.

This is an illusion. Neither is Niqab a pressing problem in today's poverty-stricken, underdeveloped Egypt, nor is the arena of debate open to all issues. Mental coercion has narrowed down the list of acceptable discussions.

Setting the boundaries of legitimate thought and expression is crucial for the wellbeing of any society. The wider the margins accepted, the more the liberty the society enjoys. These margins are not necessarily dictated by overt state control, as in the case of Third World dictatorships; sometimes, subtle mechanisms and indirect propaganda techniques delineate the framework of permissible thought.

That’s the case in established democracies, allegedly the beacons of freedom in today's world. In the United States, for example, ideas that are taken for granted, such as that capitalism is the superior arrangement of economic activity and that democracy is the best form of governance, are rarely disputed.

The mass media play a crucial role in this "thought control" process. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman describe the effect of the mass media in the US as "brainwashing under freedom." Their function is to "train the minds of the people to a virtuous attachment" to their government and to the prevailing economic and social order. As such, the so-called "free market of ideas" is in essence guided; ideas that could jeopardize the privileges of the rich and powerful in a highly unequal society are abandoned.

Only in such an illiberal milieu could infamous ideas such as Fukuyama's "end of history" be entertained and cherished. Fukuyama's theory vowed that the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy is irreversible. In his conception, both constituted the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and "the final form of human government." A weak and flawed argument, an insightful scholar like Fukuyama took only a few years to repent for. Clearly, the strict - albeit invisible and implicit - intellectual boundaries that delineate permissible thought produce ideas that perpetuate the status quo; thinking outside the box is discouraged, and possibly chastised.

In Egypt, the space for thought and expression has been tightening at alarming rates, with the mind of Egyptian society tilting towards the right. The heated discussion over whether Niqab is religiously obligatory or not makes any contentions that the Hijab (headscarf) is not obligatory (a debatable issue among theologians) seem awkward and intolerable, and thus excludes it from public debate. Under this suffocating censorship, no one would dare - like Ismael Adham did in the 1930s - write a book entitled Why Am I Atheist?

Censorship went hand in hand with the scarification of unsacred parties and issues. For instance, any explicit or implicit critique of the military establishment (or, say, its performance in the 1973 War against Israel) is today inadmissible. The number of sacred cows has been increasing.

Prolonged practice is the most effective means of indoctrination. After long periods of time of exposure to the same ideas, censorship of other ideas becomes voluntary. In Egypt, Islamists are not currently in power, but they need not worry much. That introspection is inhibited by intimidation and dissent is discouraged denotes that the doctrine of rigid Islamists has already been under way. History tells us that the control of power is often preceded by the control of ideas.

Already under a secular regime, novels have been banned by a "liberal" minister on the grounds they are blasphemous, various intellectuals were convicted by courts of being apostates and citizens were arrested for eating during the fasting hours of Ramadan.

Creativity and imagination recede when the mind is constrained by so many restrictions. Scrutiny and inquiry are substituted by stereotypic answers to all questions of life and destiny.

The withering away of the critical evaluation of ideas, thoughts and beliefs is giving way for the triviality and fundamentality of extremist minds. So at a time when the advanced world has been exploring the applications of Nanotechnology, investigating the secrets of the big bang and decoding the map of the human genome, our minds have been preoccupied with discussing the possibility of marriage between man and jinn, figuring out the mandatory length and width of the piece of cloth covering women's bodies and preaching about the benefits of drinking Prophet Mohamed's urine.

Pity the nation that was once the hub of thought and knowledge in the region.


Nael M. Shama


* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on October 29, 2009.

Saturday, October 3, 2009

In Search of a Political Abu-Treika


The current weakness and fragmentation of opposition parties and the nonchalance of public opinion suggest that perhaps nothing can disrupt the plan to groom Gamal Mubarak to the presidency in Egypt but a charismatic figure whose exemplary character can awaken people and mobilize them in defiance of the state.

Egypt, one can argue, is in need of a political Mohamed Abu Treika. The 30-year old football player has turned in the last few years into a real legend. This is not only due to Abu Treika's exceptional skills on the pitch, which helped his team (Al-Ahly) win 18 titles and Egypt's national team win two African Cups. It has more to do with his rare personality that combines exceptional kindness, decency, and modesty, qualities that bestowed on him unprecedented popularity among nearly all Egyptians.

A character with such undoubted recognition is badly needed in the political sphere if Gamal Mubarak's ascendance to the presidency is to be thwarted. However, there is a stark scarcity of charismatic leaders in political opposition parties. For example, the power base of Mahdi Akef, the octogenarian leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, is confined to the members of the MB. Liberals, leftists, Copts, and wide segments of women will not elect the leader of a movement that invites religion into politics, and relegates women to a secondary position in society.

Likewise, the chances of Ayman Nour, who came next to Hosni Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections, are minimal. Nour was portrayed by some Western commentators as Egypt's Nelson Mandela, but he is seen in Egypt as a replica of Lebanon's vocal Walid Junblat. He is powerful enough to be a trouble-maker, but he is personally weak and politically fragile to contest the prevailing balance of forces. Divisions within the ranks of his party (and his family) further weakened his position.

This scarcity of popular figures could be partially explained by the fact that incapacitating charismatic figures, who could have jeopardized Mubarak's hold on power, has been a longstanding strategy of Mubarak's regime. The sidelining of Field Marshall Mohamed Abu Ghazalla (Egypt's strong Defense Minister in the 1980s), Amr Moussa (Egypt's Foreign Minister from 1991 to 2001) and Kamal Al-Ganzoury (Egypt's Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999) are three cases in point.

The need of popular leaders could not be more imperative today. Presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and the regime is adamant about pushing Gamal Mubarak to the seat of the presidency. To be able to overcome the alliance of the formidable state, the ruling party and the business class, Egypt needs a popular leader, whose competence is not questionable, and who is free from any aura of corruption, and likely to receive the support of diverse, and conflicting, political forces and social groups.

To many observers, Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the 2005 Noble Prize laureate, meets all these criterions. Being an astute diplomat with a long experience in international affairs will secure him external support if he gets elected. In addition, and because El-Baradei is independent from the petty rivalries of Egyptian political forces, and free from any ideological affiliation, he will likely be supported by these forces, at least for one term that could herald Egypt's transition to democratic rule. Such an approval will be easier to obtain if Gamal Mubarak's bid in the upcoming presidential elections is unchallenged.

It could be rightly argued that El-Baradei, and many other suitable candidates, do not meet the rigid conditions spelled out in Article 76 of the constitution, which was notoriously amended in 2007 to facilitate Gamal's takeover of power, and exclude potential rivals. In heated moments, however, constitutional constraints count less than overwhelming popular support, particularly if this support is channeled through an administrative body, such as a coalition of all opposition parties from right to left.

If Gamal makes it to the presidential palace, he will not owe his seat to popular support or admiration, but to people's apathy and the absence of real contesters. Therefore, the duty of all Egyptians at this critical juncture is to find apt and honorable candidates and back them up in the quest for hampering a disgraceful father-to-son transmission of power in the sixty-year old Egyptian republic.

Otherwise, Egyptians will live to see the proud nation of Egypt slip into a hereditary republic, or a mere real estate whose ownership is smoothly transferred from father to son whenever he wishes.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on September 10, 2009.

Sunday, August 30, 2009

2011


Egypt is today in a transitional phase. Presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, but Egyptians are still uncertain about whether incumbent Hosni Mubarak is intending to run for a sixth term, or if he is willing to witness, or indeed oversee, a transition of power to another president.

Hosni Mubarak is in the eyes of one group of analysts a replica of power-hungry Third World authoritarian rulers, who would not relinquish authority under any circumstances. They stay in power as long as they stay in life. Mubarak's infamous statement a few years ago that he will continue to serve the nation "until the last pulse" of his heart reinforced this group's conviction that Mubarak's disappearance from the stage of Egyptian politics will only accompany his death, and never before that.

A number of reasons, however, suggest that Mubarak may not run for a new term, preferring instead to groom his son Gamal Mubarak as his successor.

First, those in the corridors of Egyptian politics and economics who began pushing for the "tawreeth" (inheritance of Gamal) scenario a few years ago based their strategy on buying time. This choice was inevitable then for two reasons. First, they realized that imposing on Egyptian people a sudden and unwanted father-to-son transmission of power could trigger wide-ranging public protests that might jeopardize the entire plan. Second, they realized that this strategy goes best with the personality of President Mubarak, who has exhibited since 1981 a natural tendency towards moderation and gradualism, and an inherent aversion to "electric-shock" policies to which his predecessors grew accustomed.

Buying time was fitting when the plan was launched around nine years ago, but, today, the pro-Gamal clique understands that buying further time is a failing strategy. If in 2011 Hosni Mubarak (at the age of 83) runs for a new six-year term, biologically speaking, the possibility of his death or incapacitation during that term will be high. Talk about the deterioration of Mubarak's health is already rife, and there are indeed visible signs that support that talk. Certainly, if Hosni Mubarak passes away as President, Gamal will lose his main base of support, and his chances of rising to power will be greatly reduced.

Secondly, throughout his reign, Mubarak's concern for the stability of his country and regime outbid all other priorities. Now, at the age of 81, it makes sense to believe that Mubarak is speculating over Egypt's fate following his demise. Even if one succumbed to the accusations of Mubarak's harshest critics, who believe that the President's concern for Egypt's national interest has diminished over the years, and has been replaced by a narrow interest in the wellbeing of himself and his family, one would still be left with Mubarak's apprehension about the safety and welfare of his family after his demise. A smooth transfer of power that maintains stability, and with it the safety of his family, must be looming high in his calculations. Such an arrangement will likely work out if Gamal succeeds him as president.

Thirdly, opposition forces are in shambles, unable to disrupt any of the regime's grand schemes. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most effective and organized opposition force, has been subject to a serious of security crackdowns since their impressive showing in the 2005 parliamentary elections. These measures have undermined the group, and diminished its capacity to defy the regime. Other opposition groups are weak, internally fragmented, suffer from a lack of resources, and their influence in the Egyptian street is limited.

In brief, politics in Egypt is in a miserable state of stagnation and fragmentation. Opposition parties and intellectuals are engaged in heated, theoretical, political debates, while average Egyptians are too busy making a living to care about the subtleties of political affairs. Nobody is more aware of the nature of this situation than the regime, for it was the architect of this "de-politization" process. Thus, Mubarak and his cohorts are probably concluding that Gamal's takeover of power will pass by smoothly, with minimal opposition and civil unrest.

Fourth, there are indicators that Mubarak's regime has strived lately to secure America's acquiescence of Gamal's rise to the presidency. The regime has also tried to convince major political and societal forces to back, explicitly or tacitly, the grooming of Gamal for the presidency. Last July, Pope Shenouda III suggested that Gamal would be the best candidate to succeed his father. Along with the Egyptian Orthodox Church, other political forces (including the Muslim Brotherhood group) may have been enticed or intimidated to take similar positions.

Will 2011 be as important as 1952, 1970 and 1981 to Egypt's history?


Nael M. Shama



* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on August 27, 2009.

Monday, July 20, 2009

On Effectiveness and Efficiency


A frequent question they ask at business schools is about the difference between "effectiveness" and "efficiency." The model answer is "effectiveness is doing the right things, and efficiency is doing things right." In other words, effectiveness is about taking the right decision, while efficiency is about implementing that decision, competently and precisely.

In terms of human resources, Egypt's population of eighty million is a real treasure, if only their time, effort and dedication are channeled into productive outlets. Egyptian society, nevertheless, often fails the test of effectiveness. Two examples in this context are noteworthy.

The zeal and energy with which Egyptians support their national football team are astonishing. During the three-week African Cup of Nations hosted by Egypt in 2006, Egyptians were united on one goal: winning the trophy. Their overwhelming support certainly contributed to the success of the Egyptian team. The same spirit infused 2008 when our team won the African Cup for the sixth time in Ghana, and also very recently with the dramatic defeat of the Italian team, the world champion, in the FIFA Confederations Cup in South Africa.

These intense emotions are, however, hardly felt in other vital fields, which makes one wonder: is there no national dream in Egypt other than winning a football cup? As a Third World country, Egypt faces a myriad of economic and social problems, the least important of which is more crucial to the wellbeing of people than the performance of the football team. If the time and effort dedicated to supporting the football team was used to eradicate poverty, develop slum areas, or increase production, we would have had a very different Egypt.

This lack of effectiveness was also witnessed when an Egyptian woman, Marwa El-Sherbini, was stabbed to death earlier this month at a courtroom in Dresden, Germany, at the hands of a xenophobic German. For this incident to cause widespread shock and outrage in Egypt is normal. But the kind of reactions that followed the tragedy revealed other important aspects.

In response to Al-Sherbini's murder, a great deal of time and effort were exerted in both online and offline campaigns exhibiting irrationality, over-emotionality, and the absence of a sense of direction. Among others, these campaigns asked the German government to submit a formal apology to its Egyptian counterpart, set up legal committees to defend the rights of the victim's family, and called for boycotting German goods.

To start with, the crime was perpetuated by an individual, not representing the German state or people in any direct way. These campaigns' references to "German racism" are tantamount to calling any Muslim "a terrorist" just because a group of Muslims hijacked a plane, or demolished a building. It is the same kind of unjust generalizations to which Muslims have been subject since the events of September, 11th.

In addition, casting doubt on the integrity and competence of Germany's judiciary overlooks the fact that Germany is a democratic country, with a fair and efficient legal system that treats all citizens and expatriates equally. Racism does exist in society, but state institutions are immune to their ramifications.

Ironically, the general public that has been so furious at Marwa's murder has never shown the same resolve against fundamental issues, such as Egypt's human rights record, the spread of corruption, or the rights of Egyptian communities abroad at large. Nor did it address the issue of racism inside Egypt, the signs of which are most evident towards dark-skinned African communities.

Obviously, the general public is not always capable of moving between multiple levels of analysis. And for an issue to attract its attention, it has to be sensationally dramatic. In this sense, elections are "too boring," economics is "extremely sophisticated," and politics is a "dirty game." The encroachment upon the rights of all Egyptians in these domains is pardoned, but the rights of Marwa El-Shirbiny, "the martyr of the veil" will "never be sacrificed."

Said differently, the rights of all Egyptians are trampled upon in various ways by an authoritarian, corrupt regime, but nothing much is done to protect these fellow citizens, or preserve their rights. On the other hand, even though the German assailant was caught, and will soon be tried, the pro-Marwa El-Sherbini campaign still draws many followers and sympathizers, because the veil is "sacred," and Germans are "racist." The death of Marwa was a sad tragedy, but juxtaposing these two realities is sadder.

In Egypt, there is no scarcity of energy. There is a scarcity of how to use it.


Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on July 16, 2009.

Sunday, July 19, 2009

A Cultural Renaissance in Egypt?

There is much talk within Cairo's cultural circles of an existing, or imminent, cultural renaissance in Egypt. The increase in the number of new bookstores and new publishers over the past few years gave the impression that Egypt is about to revive its long dead cultural life. A number of factors, however, suggest just the opposite.

To start with, much of the ongoing cultural activity is closer to “imitation” than it is to “creation.” Where creativity is scarce and exposure to the “other” abundant, plagiarism of others' theories and ideas becomes commonplace. Indeed, in Egypt, even the genres through which art and culture are expressed are borrowed from the outside, particularly the West. One cannot overlook the recent rise and spread of a number of artistic genres, which have been until recently alien to Egypt and the entire Arab world, such as standup comedians, TV sitcoms, and self-help books (that aspire to teach you almost everything in life). These genres share one common aspect: they were born and nurtured in the West. In contrast, indigenous forms of expression, such as religious chanting, traditional crafts making and storytelling of epic poems, are withering away.

Similarly, the vast majority of the shows produced by the nearly 500 Arab satellite channels, that broadcast around the clock, are just replicas of famous Western shows. It is extremely rare to find an Arab program that is centered on a creative idea, which is not plagiarized.

In a globalized world, the dominance of the West has been overwhelming. Even religious preaching has been affected by the mindset of the Western civilization. Patrick Haenni argues in L'Islam de Marche: L'Autre Revolution Conservatrice (Market Islam: The Other Conservative Revolution) that the concepts focused upon by the modern, televangelist preacher Amr Khaled are compatible with the tenets of globalization. Unlike preachers of earlier generations, who have reduced Islam to the notion of Jihad, the drive for syncretism between Islam and globalization has characterized the approach of Khaled and many other preachers. These preachers' brand of Islam, described by Haenni as “air-conditioned Islam,” is centered on concepts like self-improvement, personal salvation and economic success. No wonder then that the values of success, hard work, efficiency and self-development are among Khaled's favorite topics.

There can also be no cultural renaissance as long as levels of scientific and cultural production remain as low as they are today. In 2007, the total number of books published in the entire Arab world -- Egypt included -- stood at 27,000. That’s less than the annual production of many developing countries. The tradition of translation, one of the channels for passing on the knowledge of other cultures, has also faltered in the region. To cite just one example, Greece translates five times more works than all Arab states combined.

In addition, the quality of education in Egypt has been rapidly deteriorating for the past few decades. Today, no Egyptian university could be found in the list of the top 500 universities in the world. Graduates of Egyptian universities are not in demand, even in neighboring Arab states, which were until very recently the prime recruiter of the Egyptian work force.

An increase in the number of bookstores does not always indicate a cultural awakening. Indeed, it could point to the exact opposite, reflecting the dominance of consumerism, and the decline of cultural taste. The sales figures of blogs-turned-books are bigger than works written by prominent novelists. One can blame it on new marketing techniques, which have found in the book market a new field, mostly to sell works of shallow content and low linguistic quality. In other words, nothing fundamental has changed with regards to the quantity and quality of cultural production, except for a sly attempt at decanting old wine into a new bottle.

Certainly, a cultural awakening cannot go in tandem with the absence of creativity, low levels of production and a deterioration of standards of education. Indeed, the distinguished Syrian philosopher and poet Adonis argued that because of their negligible contribution to thought and science, Arabs have become extinct:
"If I look at the Arabs, with all their resources and great capacities, and I compare what they have achieved over the past century with what others have achieved in that period, I would have to say that we Arabs are in a phase of extinction, in the sense that we have no creative presence in the world."


Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on July 2, 2009.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Investing in Tragedies


Following the failed assassination attempt on President Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in 1995, the Egyptian regime quickly used the occasion to serve its own interests. Just like opportunists who appear at the corner of every disaster in search for hidden opportunities, the Egyptian regime decided to use the unpleasant incident to bolster Mubarak's legitimacy at home. Representative of different segments of the society, such as MPs, members of professional guilds, sheikhs and priests, athletes, artists, etc, were asked to visit the presidential palace to pledge allegiance, and promise continued support, to the president and his regime. For weeks, state-run television channels aired hours of sham celebrations, which included pre-prepared proceedings full of pretense speeches and forged emotions.

Unsurprisingly, the strategy backfired. Initial popular relief that the president survived the terrorist attack turned into indignation at the regime and its cheap propaganda methods.

Something similar took place following the sudden death of President Mubarak's grandson last month. The genius minds running Egypt's official media found in the tragedy an opportunity to increase Mubarak's scant popularity among his people. State-owned television channels broadcast religious songs and Quranic recitations around the clock. Egypt's Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa, called upon Egyptian women to mourn the death by wearing black. And members of the ruling National Democratic Party missed no opportunity to express their grief over the painful misfortune, and to assure Mubarak that all Egyptians are “his sons and daughters.”

Under monarchial rule, the personal tragedies of ruling families were routinely turned into national ones. But Egypt is no monarchy. The mere existence of a "ruling family" in a sixty year-old republic is an offense to the country and its people. Anyone with a shred of wisdom and decency knows that Egyptians should be only loyal to their country, not their de-facto ruling family.

To attempt to 'nationalize the mourning' of Mubarak's family is both opportunistic and pathetic. It is opportunistic because it capitalizes on Mubarak's personal loss to garner support for his leadership and regime. And it is pathetic because it reveals that the proponents of the regime, in their desperate quest for increasing the regime's popularity and acceptance, found no other means but this unprincipled and tasteless method.

Indeed, in Mubarak's Egypt, failures are abundant and successes are scarce. No real "success story" has been achieved in politics, economics, and science over the nearly three decades of Mubarak's rule. Among the regime's staunch advocates, there are of course those who argue that the triumph of the Egyptian football squad and scientist Ahmed Zoweil's winning of the Nobel Prize in chemistry are among the achievements of Mubarak's era, but what kind of idiots would swallow such delusions?

In contrast to the state of mourning applied for the President's grandson, the Egyptian state and media did not mourn the tragic death of the 1,034 Egyptians who were aboard the ferry "Salam 98" that drowned in the Red Sea three years ago. In fact, at the time relatives of the deceased were beaten in the Port of Safaga for daring to protest against the negligence and corruption of the government, President Mubarak was at Cairo Stadium celebrating the Egyptian football team's victory of the African Cup of Nations. So why should Egyptian people now mourn the death of his grandson? After all, in civil states, all citizens are supposed to be equal.

The human heart is covered with sadness and sympathy when a young boy -- any young boy -- dies. That this son is the relative of the president, or any senior official, does not add any further sadness. The architects of the media campaign, however, overlooked the fact that the public's sympathy with the heartbreak of the president has not changed its assessment of his failing approaches and policies. Their grief was a sign of respect for death itself, a feature of life Egyptians have always revered.

On the personal level, feelings of compassion prevailed. But these feelings have not blocked rational thinking. They have not made Egyptians forget that the mismanagement and corruption of their state over the past few decades led to the death of thousands of Egyptians. In burning trains, drowning ferries, in bread lines and in slaughter houses, wrongly labeled as "police stations," death has found a fertile ground. The state mourned none of these victims.

Regimes short on legitimacy act in many respects like opportunists devoid of decency. This statement should come as no surprise, for ruling without legitimacy is, in the final analysis, equal to killing without a license.

Nael M. Shama

Sunday, April 12, 2009

It’s a Shame Culture, Stamp Sexual Harassers

Sociologists consider Egyptian society a 'shame culture,' in which the status of people as perceived by others counts for almost everything. In contrast to a 'guilt society,' where people feel guilty about their wrongdoings even if they are undetected by the society, in the 'shame culture,' the opinion of the group is very relevant. Because of the widespread belief that "there is no smoke without fire," people are keen not only to 'be' innocent, but also to be perceived as such by others. Suspicion is sufficient to ruin one's reputation, even if he/she are not proven to be guilty.

For millennia, Egypt has been a hydraulic society, with most of its population relying in subsistence predominantly on the River Nile. Egypt is a huge desert, except for the banks of the Nile and the tightly-packed Delta region and this is where life could have been sustained. Until modernity, which brought massive immigration to cities, the village has constituted the prime unit of Egypt's society.

By virtue of immigration from the countryside to the city, the ethos of village life has permeated urban life, whether in values, mentality or language. In Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? Changes in Egyptian Society from 1950 to the Present, prominent thinker Galal Amin provides several examples of that infiltration.

The term 'Rayyis' (commander or leader) is traditionally used to refer to craftsmen, but has been frequently used in modern times in reference to the Egyptian President. Men salute by kissing each other's cheeks, even if they have just departed, is another village ritual that has become prevalent in the city.

In the some 5,000 villages of Egypt, the individual is subservient to the needs and wants of the group. Family and clan matters become, automatically, of direct concern to the individual and mutual interdependence in daily life and business matters is the norm. Conformity thus is imperative. Describing life in the countryside, pedagogy expert Hamed Ammar writes that the compelling moral in the village is that "the individual, to be in line with the group, should express group sympathy; if the group is angry, he should be angry, if it is insulted, he must feel that he is insulted."

In other words, group opinion is not only crucial, but also binding. In the case of deviation, punishment through humiliation is the group's instrument in exercising control and eliminating dissent. Being shamed by the group is thus avoided at all costs. A man's reputation is his Achilles heel; he would go to great lengths to preserve it.

That is why Egyptians, when asked about their life ambitions, say that they want nothing from life but 'elsatr' (literally, cover or protection). In effect, what is sought is protection from poverty, from being scandalized, from losing face in community.

Having said that, and in light of the growing rates of sexual harassment in Egyptian society, one can devise a remedy that takes advantage of that preoccupation with one's image in the eyes of the community. Stripping harassers of dignity and respect – or 'blackening their face' as the Egyptian expression goes – could frighten them and dissuade them from committing these disgraceful acts.

That could be effectively done by stamping sexual harassers on their face with an ink that leaves no permanent marks, quite similar to the blue ink in which voters dip their fingers to avoid double voting. The effect of that ink could last for days or weeks, depending on technical feasibility and the judgment of legislators. It is reasonable to believe that, technically speaking, the mass production of that ink at low costs is not impossible.

To avoid defamation in the eyes of neighbors, work colleagues, relatives and the society at large, stamped harassers may well choose to stay at home until the effect of the ink withers away. This could be a very powerful deterrent.

Theorizing about the idea is certainly much easier than its actual implementation. A long list of legal and operational considerations should be carefully checked before enforcement.

But the idea is still worth consideration. The English writer Arthur Clarke says: "new ideas pass through three periods: 1) It can't be done. 2) It probably can be done, but it's not worth doing. 3) I knew it was a good idea all along." The initial reaction might not necessarily be the final one.

Nael M. Shama

* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on April 9, 2009.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Sex at First Sight


The unprecedented court verdict that handed ten rapists the death penalty for kidnapping and gang raping a woman in the governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh revived once again the debate over sexual harassment in Egypt, the reasons behind it and the best means to combat it.

A plethora of explanations are provided to account for the rise of sexual harassment rates in Egypt. Sexual frustration, economic hardships, moral decadence, and gender inequality in addition to a myriad of psychological disturbances are all plausible explanations. It is certainly hard to attribute the phenomenon to one factor only; a combination of factors came into play over the past few decades to produce the ugly trend.

A number of assumptions are imperative here.

First, breaching the private space of individuals – both men and women -- has lately become common in Egypt. Admittedly, 'private space,' which is considered to be "the region surrounding each person, or that area which a person considers their domain or territory," is habitually contravened in public places (streets, governmental offices, queues, etc).

This development could be attributed to the population boom that Egypt has seen over the past three decades. Since 1981, Egypt's population almost doubled. Living in densely-populated environments produces a 'culture of crowdedness,' which promotes certain values and demotes others. Cairo's shantytowns are crammed with people, and homes are too proximate and in some cases overlapping; privacy is a nonexistent luxury. As a result, the sacredness of people's private domains has disappeared, giving way to a communal way of living, where property, showers, clothes, etc, are shared.

However, this type of involuntary communal living is not necessarily conducive to cooperation and harmony. In the crowd, and under harsh economic and social conditions, some people tend to believe that they are at war with everybody else. After all, an abundance of human souls are competing for scarce bread and medicine. Suffice it to observe the belligerent self-seeking attitude in queues or on the streets of Cairo to learn that conflict – perhaps, even, 'the war of all against all' – has become the prime form of interaction among Egyptians.

What is prevailing is a life outlook that is individualistic and materialistic. It is individualistic because the sense of the community has diminished, and has been substituted by a self-centered, interest-driven posture. It is materialistic because, beneath the façade of popular religiosity, the spread of corruption, aggression, intolerance, and bad demeanor attests to a serious degree of moral decadence.

Secondly, it could be argued that in such an environment, women are more vulnerable to breaches of privacy than men. In male-dominated societies, women are perceived to be both weaker and inferior. And religious texts are often misconstrued to prove this assumption right. The toll of the lack of privacy has fallen primarily on women.

Thirdly, women are predominantly seen through the prism of sex. Therefore, violating their private domains would, before anything else, impinge on their bodies.

Admittedly, the efforts of the National Council of Women and the state's feverish promotion of the role of women in public life did not change the notorious, deep-seated beliefs and perceptions of women. To many Egyptian men, the simple fact that a woman could be a good mother, a caring wife, a supportive friend, or a skilled manager does not really exist. Their minds seem to be fixated on the equation between women and all sorts of sexual nuances, hence the rise in sexual abuse.

According to the Ministry of Interior, twenty thousand women are raped each year in Egypt (i.e. an average of 55 women are raped every day). Since the victims are mostly reluctant to give an account of their ordeal, the numbers are estimated to be much higher. “If the Ministry of the Interior gets 20,000 then you should multiply it by 10,” Engy Ghozlan of the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR) told Middle East Online last year. Sexual harassment is also on the rise. In a study conducted by ECWR in July 2007, 83% of Egyptian women and 98% of foreigners reported being harassed, half of which described it as a daily occurrence.

In Egypt, the general outlook towards women has changed from 'love at first sight' a few decades ago to 'sex at first sight' today. The first idiom reflected the romantic and peaceful character of Egypt in the 1940's, 50's and 60's. The second reflects a lust- driven, animalistic approach that reduces the identity and role of women to the pleasure of sex.


Nael M. Shama



* This article was published in Daily News (Egypt) on March 26, 2009.