1- Resources and Aspirations
Egypt
traditionally sees itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. In his
manifesto The Philosophy of the Revolution, former Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel-Nasser (ruled 1954-1970) rambled on about a leading role in the
region that is "wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it."
This role, he added, "should at last settle down, weary and worn out, on
our frontiers beckoning us to move, to dress up for it and to perform it since
there is nobody else who could do so."[i] The foreign policy of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, particularly the
go-it-alone peace deal with Israel, led to Egypt's ostracization in the region.
But Sadat was confident that Egypt's isolation in its sphere of influence was only
temporary, and that Arabs were bound to follow in its footsteps. Although Mubarak
was not interested in the flamboyance of leadership, preferring instead to be a
distant, bureaucratic president of a status quo state, he still clung to a
vital Egyptian involvement in the Palestinian problem.
The recent rise
of Al-Sisi in Egyptian politics revived nationalist sentiments and ambitions
after decades of dormancy. Fostered by state institutions and the pro-regime mass
media, ostensibly as a bulwark against Islamism, these nationalist sentiments
bred a wave of great expectations. On Egypt's cafes and television shows, analogies
are frequently drawn between Al-Sisi and Nasser, the leader whose reign
witnessed the most dynamic and change-oriented Egyptian foreign policy in modern
times. Great hopes are pinned on Al-Sisi's leadership. He will be another
Nasser, his supporters wish, taking on the mantle of leadership, defying
international powers and restoring Egypt's wounded prestige in the world.
But times
have massively changed. Capitalizing on political determination and the availability
of resources, Nasser could, with relative ease, fund revolutionary movements in
Africa, provide support for Arab states against Israel and lead the developing
world, under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement, against the plots of
superpowers. His electrifying charisma added an element of inspiration and
magic to his foreign policy. For more than ten years (1956-1967), the role
Nasser had envisaged as a young officer rested indeed on Egypt's shores.
Egypt's dire
economic situation today inhibits its ability to play the same role. Three
years of political turmoil took a great toll on its economy, slowing down
economic growth and foreign investment flows and reducing tourism and export
earnings. In foreign affairs, the economic crisis increased Egypt's
vulnerability and deepened its dependence on Gulf states, especially Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, who together provided more than $20 billion in various
forms of assistance to Egypt since Morsi's ouster.[ii] As
a result, Egypt's foreign policy has been increasingly wedded to the interests
of Gulf states, with less autonomy and a narrow margin of maneuverability being
the outcome.
The change
in Egypt's stance toward the Syrian conflict is proof of this. Morsi had vocally
supported the Syrian "revolution." He severed diplomatic ties with
Syria's regime during a rally in which hardline Islamists called for
"jihad" against Bashar al-Assad. But a few weeks after the coup,
Egypt's Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy announced that Egypt is reevaluating its
relationship with Syria, adding that Morsi's decision to cut diplomatic ties
with Damascus would be "re-examined."[iii] In
the following months, Cairo's policy on Syria came closer to that endorsed by
its Gulf allies, indicating a policy that is "shaped by donors."[iv]
Al-Sisi must
find a creative answer to this predicament: How to reconcile needed economic
aid from donors with an independent foreign policy? Without aid, Egypt's ailing
economy will continue to suffer, but for a populist president like Al-Sisi, dependency
on - or worse, acquiescence to - the small oil Sheikhdoms will come at a huge cost:
diminished popularity and reminiscence of the notorious days of Mubarak, not
Nasser.
2- Authoritarianism and the Outside World
The ouster
of Morsi, and the subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), unleashed
all the demons of the authoritarian state, which had been dormant since Mubarak's
overthrow in 2011. In the name of combating terrorism and restoring the
'prestige' of the state, thousands have been killed and arrested in the span of
a few months, an Orwellian protest law was issued and dissent has been quashed
using all possible means. Such draconian measures cannot take place in today's
globalized, interconnected world, which attaches great importance to liberties
and human rights issues, without international ramifications.
Indeed, widespread
human rights abuses in Egypt elicited major responses from various
international players. The African Union, for instance, suspended Egypt's membership
days after Morsi's removal in July 2013. As a result, Egypt (along with
international pariahs Zimbabwe and Sudan) was last January excluded from attending
the high-profile US-Africa Leaders Summit, which will take place in Washington
next August. Also, a joint declaration was issued last March by 27 member
states in the United Nations Human Rights Council, expressing concern over
Egypt's excessive use of force against protestors, and asking the Egyptian
authorities to hold those responsible for the abuses to account. In the same
vein, the outcry of international journalists over the trial of the journalists
of Al-Jazeera's Cairo office continues unabated, causing embarrassment for the
Egyptian government in major world capitals.
Al-Sisi will
soon be caught between internal and external allies. A large segment of his
power base rejects any conciliation with the MB, and advocates continuing – or
even escalating – the crackdown on dissidents, Islamists and revolutionary
youth alike. Moreover, any attempt to reform state institutions, especially the
gigantic security apparatus, will be resisted by a state that has become too
old and too corrupt to change its notorious ways. On the other hand, blatant authoritarianism
at home will continue to strain Egypt's relations with the outside world,
especially the United States and European countries, undermining foreign aid,
investment and Egypt's international reputation.
3- Few Allies, Many Antagonists
Egypt has
few allies in the region: the Gulf states. With the exception of Qatar, which
dances to a different drum, these states have an abundance of petrodollars and harbor
an abundance of antipathy towards Islamist movements - the perfect allies of today's
Egypt. Conversely, because of their support for the MB, Turkey, Qatar and Hamas
are seen in Cairo as barefaced adversaries. Egypt's relations with neighboring Libya
and Sudan are cordial, but fraught with tension. The Sudan did not toe the line
of Egypt over Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam, which Egypt regards as a menace to
its share of Nile water. The inability of Libya's government to curb arms
trafficking across the border, and to control the Islamic militias that are
hostile to Egypt's regime, and the latter's reluctance to extradite members of
Gaddafi's regime who live in Egypt are causes of friction in Egyptian-Libyan
ties.[v]
Egypt's formal diplomatic relations with Iran have been severed since 1980, and
their restoration is nowhere on the horizon.
Egypt therefore
is semi-isolated in the region where it is centered, the Middle East. Proximate
states such as Libya, Qatar, Sudan and Hamas – and, in the wider region, Turkey,
Iran and Ethiopia – are not allies. They all fall within the scope of hostile,
unfriendly or, at best, neutral states. In response to this inimical milieu,
the strategy of the post-Morsi regime has rested on escalation. Cairo expelled
the Turkish ambassador in November, recalled its ambassador to Doha in January,
and an Egyptian court labeled Hamas a terrorist organization in March. Media
assaults on Ankara, Doha and Hamas have verged on hysteria, reflecting how
distant reconciliation is.
However, not
only cannot a strategy that is premised on confrontation survive, especially
for a pivotal country with leadership aspirations, but it could also be very
detrimental. For instance, suffocating Hamas for too long might drive its
radical elements to forge ties with the Islamist insurgents in Sinai. Also, Egypt
will not be able to mediate between the belligerent Palestinian factions, Fateh
and Hamas, or between Israel and the Palestinians if it continues to boycott
Hamas. Moreover, the legitimacy of Egypt's new president will be undercut if he
is seen at home as colluding with Israel against the besieged and
poverty-stricken Palestinians. Likewise, a protracted state of tension with two
regional powers like Turkey and Iran is neither constructive nor conducive to
regional stability.
Which
strategic formula will Al-Sisi embrace to confront these threats, break out of
this isolation, and restore Egypt's stature in the region? Escalation may undermine
Egypt's national security and ignite a new Arab Cold War, to whose ill winds no
state would be immune, but inaction could be costly, too. So will Al-Sisi
manage to strike a balance between both courses of action, with skill, intellect
and prescience?
Foreign
policy victories and failures were kingmakers and breakers in Egypt. The
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the 'Crossing' in 1973 made
Nasser and Sadat national heroes. In contrast, the 1967 defeat heralded Nasser's
political demise, and Sadat's separate peace with Israel 10 years later precipitated
his assassination. Undoubtedly, Al-Sisi will soon be put to serious tests. Will
his foreign policy be his crowning glory or his knockout punch?
Nael M. Shama
* This article appeared first on AhramOnline on June
11, 2014.
[i] Gamal
Abdel-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Cairo: Information
Agency, 1954, p. 68. (in Arabic)
[ii] "Gulf Aid to Egypt
Since 30 June More than $20 Billion: El-Sisi" AhramOnline, 6 May
2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/100653/Egypt/Politics-/Gulf-aid-to-Egypt-since--June-more-than--billion-E.aspx.
[iii] "Egypt to Re-evaluate Relations with Syria," Al-Jazeera.com,
21 July 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201372013042628686.html.
[iv] Michele Dunne,
"Foreign Policy Shaped by Donors," Sada, 3 April 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/03/foreign-policy-shaped-by-donors/h6z0.
[v] Mohamed Elmenshawy,
"Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations," Middle East
Institute, 21 March 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/bad-neighbor-good-neighbor-libya-egypt-relations.
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